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synergies. We shall also look at the risks associated with using carbon regulation in 
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on the structure and performance of the carbon reduction policies during the three 
phases - NAP1, NAP2 and NAP3, paying close attention to free allocation and 
auctioning. Finally we shall discuss risk-reduction methods, focusing on a potential 
hybrid model combining both cap-and-trade and taxation with a percentage of the 
revenues redistributed to the developing world to stimulate climate change agenda.
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Topic characteristics
Environmental economics tools have been widely employed to design policies targeted at 
reducing carbon emissions. The most comprehensive example of using a market-based 
approach for environmental regulation is EU ETS, that has become the first and the only such 
scheme in the world. During the five years of its functioning it has demonstrated both strengths 
and weaknesses. One of the most problematic issues of EU ETS is price volatility of emission 
permits that is influencing decision making of all the actors involved. In my thesis I would like to 
research the ways which could help reduce the volatility by using regulatory instruments.
Hypotheses
There are a number of ways in which the EU ETS can develop in the future. There is a chance 
that a hybrid model combing both cap-and-trade and a floor tax will be implemented. In my 
thesis I would like to investigate this scenario and see its potential implications for the 
effectiveness of the climate change policies.
Methodology
In order to analyze the potential hybrid model for regulating carbon I would like to use the 
latest research in the field available dealing with the outcomes of different carbon regulating 
schemes. Using Ekins' idea of floor tax, I would like to build up a discussion on how, by 
combining cap-and-trade and taxation systems, the EU can achieve stable emission permit 
price.
Short outline of the thesis
Chapter 1. Economics of Climate Change
Introduction to the problem of climate change and its economic effects. Overlook of scientific 
evidence and costs associated with both action and inaction. Discussion of the double dividend 
concept.
Chapter 2. Responding to Climate Change
Review of the ways in which climate change can be addressed: technology and market-based 
instruments. Introduction to the idea o f carbon as a negative externality and discussion of both 
pigovian tax and Coase's environmental endowments. Linking theory to practical 
implementation, embodied in carbon tax, cap-and-trade and voluntary carbon market.
Chapter 3. International regimes regulating global warming
Discussing the role of the Kyoto Protocol and its major instruments: CDM and Jl. Overview of 
the Copenhagen Conference and its results. Introduction to the EU ETS.
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Chapter 4. The EU carbon policy
Detailed discussion of the EU ETS, its origins and development during NAP1, NAP2, NAP3. 
Analysis of allocation methods: free distribution, benchmarking and auctioning. Introduction to 
the problem of permit price volatility.
Chapter 5. Hybrid model
Defining the risks that the EU faces and ways to resolve them: import tax option and floor price 
introduction to balance the volatile permit price under cap-and-trade.
Chapter 6. EU competitiveness and carbon leakage
Discussing the way developing nations and technology choices influence the EU 
competitiveness, with a specific focus on carbon leakage and its threats. Suggesting the use of 
part of the floor tax revenue for investment in jo int carbon reduction projects in the developing 
world in order to put climate change o f the global agenda.
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Introduction
Global warming has recently evolved from a purely environmental issue into a 
political and economic one. Climate change debate is now more often referred to as 
climate crisis debate, where the focus is not on whether facts regarding the warming of 
the planet are scientifically justifiable, but on how humanity can prevent the planet’s 
ecosystem from falling into a total collapse. Moreover, the 'debate', albeit still fueled by 
some global warming skeptics, is no longer a debate at all: several governments 
around the world have initiated legislation curbing C02 emissions, economists are 
looking at various carbon market regulation opportunities, and investors are searching 
for a formula that can help them forecast carbon price trend, making carbon the focus 
of attention for researchers from all walks of science.
This work will consider the latest developments in the economics of climate 
change and, assuming that the European Union Emission Trading Scheme is the most 
functional result that could have been achieved given all kinds of political, economic 
and social conflicts that surrounded its implementation, look at how it can protect its 
competitive advantage vis-a-vis risks emanating from developing nations that do not 
have a similar environmental regulation in place. The work will consider regulatory 
alternatives and discuss the potential for a hybrid system of carbon taxation and cap- 
and-trade that, if implemented, may alleviate the problem of carbon price volatility and 
lead to increased revenues for the EU member states. Some part of these revenues, 
as it will be seen, could be used to invest into joint carbon reduction projects that 
address carbon reduction in the developing nations that are hit most both by the 
changing climate and carbon leakage. Establishing closer cooperation with developing 
countries has the potential to improve compliance with regulatory standards across the 
world.
In the first chapter we shall discuss why carbon matters and why it became 
the focus of environmental regulation. We shall look at scientific evidence and the 
implications of it for the policy-makers. We shall also consider the findings provided by 
global warming skeptics in order to have a more balanced look at the subject in 
question. The cost of both action and inaction will be presented, followed by an
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introduction of a double dividend concept, which suggests that climate regulation not 
only helps towards reducing carbon footprint, but also increases competitiveness and 
efficiency. This background knowledge will serve as an introduction to the regulation 
theory discussed in the following chapter.
The second chapter will commence by discussing the potential of technology 
in resolving the issue of climate change and continue with an introduction to the 
environmental regulation theory based on the concept of carbon as a negative 
externality that can be resolved via introduction of either a pigovian tax or by 
distributing Coase's environmental endowments. These tools - evolved into a carbon 
tax, cap-and-trade system and voluntary market - will be discussed in detail. We shall 
conclude by making a comparison of the available options.
In the third chapter we shall look at the possibilities of international 
cooperation for stopping the climate change, discussing all-inclusive and club 
approaches together with their positive and negative sides. Most of the chapter will be 
devoted to the Kyoto Protocol, its origins, framework agreements, tools, achievements 
and failures. We shall also talk about the aspirations and resutls of the Copenhagen 
Summit and its inplications for the future of the global carbon regulation, setting a 
proper framework for a more focused discussion of carbon emissions trading in the EU 
in the chapters to follow.
All of the fourth chapter will be devoted to the first carbon emission scheme 
that exists in the world -  the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS). A 
historical overview of how the scheme came about will be provided in order to 
understand underlying intentions, contradictions, theoretical foundations and 
aspirations. We shall look at how the powers in the EU are distributed between the 
Commission and the member states, resulting in a peculiar interaction and outcomes. 
Special attention will be given to the EU ETS allocation methods, namely, free 
distribution, benchmarking and auctioning. We shall see whether a choice of any 
particular method affects the price of the permits and whether the past allocation 
experience together with aspirations for a future change can resolve the problem of 
price volatility of emission credits. After revising the theoretical assumptions of
12
allocation we shall discuss national allocation plans -  the first two phases currently 
implemented that can be analyzed to draw conclusions, as well as the third phase, that 
has been designed but is yet to take effect. Finally we shall discuss the reasons for 
both criticism and praise that the system has received. In the following chapter this will 
allow us to discuss risks that the EU may potentially face.
The fifth chapter will be focused on the risks that the EU ETS is facing, 
developing a number of ideas about how to counterbalance them. Specifically, we shall 
look at an import tax option and its practical viability within the framework of WTO and 
free trade agreements. Carbon taxation will be given a scrutiny and suggestions about 
how it can be used to lower the price volatility will be offered. The chapter will end with 
a tentative suggestion of a hybrid climate control scheme, wedding both the carbon tax 
and the cap-and-trade already in place.
The sixth chapter will look at how imbalances created by the EU ETS can be 
faced. It will be argued that developing nations are presenting the major threat to the 
competitiveness of the EU products that are constrained by environmental regulation. 
At the same time we shall see that the developing world has become prey of carbon 
leakage from the developed world, posing a threat to a sustainable development of the 
world's climate. We shall revisit the EU flagship role in driving the psychological and 
institutional change in the realm of environmental policy and consider the options of 
risk reduction based on implementing a hybrid model, allowing some percentage of tax 
revenues to be used for sponsoring carbon reduction projects in the developing world. 
The chapter will conclude by assessing the means the EU has in order to put climate 
change on the developing world agenda.
In summary, this thesis will depart from a rather vast notion of climate change 
and its economic consequences. Through a series of close-ups it will work its way 
towards environmental regulation with a focus on the EU ETS, potential change to it in 
a form of additional taxation and creation of a hybrid model. The risks to competition 
will be discussed, suggesting investing resources from a complimentary carbon tax to 
the developing world in order to bolster compliance with environmental regulation and 
to prevent further carbon leakage from the developed world. The work will move from
13
theoretical grounds to practical examples, ending in a suggestion of a new model for 
bringing more compliance to the international environment regulation practice.
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Chapter 1. Economics of Climate Change
In this chapter we shall look at the scientific evidence o f global warming and 
the research findings available today. We shall also look at the cost o f both action and 
inaction in response to climate change, finishing by the double dividend theory that 
suggests positive outcomes of regulatory actions.
1 Why carbon matters
We believe it is important to give a short overview of how carbon affects the 
atmosphere of the planet to set the discourse about why carbon reductions are 
necessary. As noticed by the recipient of the 2008 Nobel Prize in Economics Paul 
Krugman, there are three reasons why climate change has to be addressed.
First, global warming exists, as is proven by the fact that since 1970 every 
successive decade was warmer than the previous one. C02 is a long-lived gas that 
accumulates in the atmosphere, staying there for centuries1. This is aggravated by the 
loss of natural carbon sinks on land and in the ocean that trap C02 from the 
atmosphere, meaning that the temperatures are bound to grow further2.
Second, climate models used 20 years ago to predict climate change 
compared against real life facts have proven to be correct, giving credit to modeling 
techniques used today3.
Third, there is a non-negligible probability of an utter disaster which should 
dominate climate policy.Small changes in the earth's atmosphere in a non-linear
1 Krugman,P., 'Building a Green Economy', The New York Times, 4.5, 2010 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/magazine/11Economy-t.html?pagewanted=all> [accessed 30 
April 2010] (para. 22 of 81).
2 Bayon, R.; Hawn, A.; Hamilton, K., Voluntary Carbon Markets: An International Business Guide to 
What They Are and How They Work (Environmental Market Insights), UK and US: Earthscan 2009, 
p.2.
3 Paul Krugman, 'Building a Green Economy', (para. 23 of 81).
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manner may lead to 'abrupt climate changes4. Scientist believe that a global 
temperature exceeding the present one by 2 degrees (a number chosen to be the 
ceiling for carbon increase) already happened in the Eem period, around 125,000 
years ago, providing evidence of abrupt and uncontrolled climatic events happening as 
a result5.
........................1.1 Historical overview
Let us begin with a brief outline of the developments in the environmental 
science. The first studies of the atmosphere and its potential to trap heat were made as 
early as in the nineteenth century by the French mathematician joseph Fourier, who 
suggested that the atmosphere keeps the earth's surface warm both by letting solar 
heat in and by trapping some of the longer-wave radiation that bounces back from its 
surface. Based on observing the effects of the Industrial Revolution, a Swedish 
scientist Svante Arrhenius came to a conclusion that the earth's surface could be 
warming due to the burning of fossil fuels in factories. David Keeling, whose studies 
laid the foundations of Al Gore's political agenda centred around climate change, 
established daily observations in Hawaii and in 1957 which confirmed that human 
activity amplified the natural 'greenhouse effect', causing temperature increase of 
0.6°C during the twentieth century. Based on Keeling's conclusions the United States 
National Academy of Sciences warned in 1979 that by 2015 the warming could 
produce 6°C temperature increase and change the world climate6.
It has been recently calculated that fifty per cent increase in emissions 
occurred from 1974 to 20047, the summer of 2005 being the hottest ever observed in 
the Northern Hemisphere8. Today atmospheric C02 levels are at its highest in the last 
650,000 years. As for the concentration of C02 in the atmosphere, due to the use of 
fossil fuels in transportation, agriculture, energy generation and industrial production its
4 Weitzman.M. L., The Extreme Uncertainty of Extreme Climate Change: An Overview and Some 
Implications', preliminary article, Harvard University, 2009
<http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/weitzman/files/ExtremeUncertaintyCliCh.pdf>.
5 Andersen, M.S.; Ekins, P., Carbon Energy Taxation. Lessons from Europe, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2009, p. 258.
6 Labatt, S.; White,R.R., Carbon Finance. The Financial Implications of Climate Change, Hoboken,
NJ: Wiley&Sons, Inc. 2007, pp.5-7.
7 Baumert, K.; Herzog, T.; Pershing, J., 'Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse Gas Data and 
International Climate Policy', World Resource Institute, 2005, www.wri.org.
8 Silvern, N.; Dlugolecki, A.,'The Day Before Tomorrow', Environmental Finance 7(4), 2006, pp.28-29.
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levels have risen from 280 parts per million (ppm) in the 18th and 19th centuries to 
today's 387 ppm. According to IPCC, with the world population reaching 9 billion and 
with the business-as-usual (BAU) development of the world economy, by 2030 the 
concentration of gas is expected to reach 500ppm, whereas in another 20 years, 
around 2050, the temperature has been projected to increase by 2.3°C9. This is more 
than scientists believe safe: to keep the planet under the 2-degree warming ceiling 
agreed internationally, the concentration will have to be stabilized at 450 ppm, 30-40% 
below 1990 levels, the year that was chosen by the Kyoto Protocol10.
Year
Chart 1: The Physical Science Basis of Climate Change: Latest Findings to be 
Assessed by WGI in AR5, IPCC http://www. ipcc. ch/pdf/presentations/COP15- 
presentations/stocker09unfcccCopenhagen_delegate_new.pdf
Chart 1 created by the IPCC summarizes the concerns about increasing global 
average temperatures, increasing see level and melting snow. Recent findings suggest 
that even these predictions are underestimated, making previously worst-case 
scenarios base-line projections. The figures mentioned so far might actually double11.
.........................1.2 Economic costs
The changes that occurred over the last two centuries of intensive fossil fuels
9 Labatt, S., Carbon Finance, pp.5-7.
10 Stern, N., 'The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change', www.sternreview.ora.uk.
11 Krugman.P., 'Building a Green Economy', (para. 26 of 81).
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use pose a threat of a catastrophe12. It will manifest itself in mutilated precipitation 
patterns, resulting in some regions being a lot wetter while other regions getting drier, 
causing storms, increased sea level and coastal flooding. These events pose a danger 
of the world economic decline, comprehensively explained in the Stern Review on the 
Economics of Climate Change, conducted by Sir Nicholas Stern on the request of the 
British government with the objective of identifying economic challenges related to 
climate change. The review predicts a 5-10 per cent loss in global GDP if the warming 
reaches 5-6°C, arguing that global climate change can cost world economies as much 
as $7 trillion in lost output, creating 200 million environmental refugees13.
Deaths from climate change
12-40 
I  40 ♦ 80 
| 80 - *20 estim ates b y  W HO sub-region fo r 2000 (W HO  Wo<r&3 Health Report. 2002). 
Copy«gb» W H O  2005 A ll righto resented
Illustration 1: WHO estimates of extra deaths (per million people) from climate 
change in 2000http://webarchive.nationalarchives. gov. uk/+/http://www. hm- 
treasury. gov. uk/d/Part_ll_lntroduction_group.pdf
Excess carbon has serious non-market consequences as well, such as inferior 
well-being, poorer health - especially in tropical countries, increased mortality rate and 
30 per cent drop in income14. Illustration 1 shows deaths from climate change.
Examples of climate change consequences are readily available. The research 
findings presented by the MIT atmospheric science professor Kerry Emanuel 
repeatedly demonstrated both in 2005 and 2008 that Hurricane Katrina, which saw 1 
million people displaced, 1836 dead and causing $89.6 billion of damage15, is linked to
12 Weitzman.M. L., The Extreme Uncertainty of Extreme Climate Change'.
13 Stern, N., The Stern Review'.
14 Nordhaus, W. D.; Boyer, J., Warming the World: Economic Models of Global Warming, Cambridge, 
Mass: MIT Press 2000, pp 69-71.
15 Knabb, R.D.; Rhome, J.R.; Brown, D.P., 'Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina: 23-30 August 
2005', National Hurricane Center, 10.8, 2006 <http://www.nhc.noaa.aov/pdf/TCR-
AL122005 Katrina.pdf> [accesses 1 May 2010],
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global w arm ing16.
Businesses -  the main drivers of any economy -  run physical risks associated 
with climate change. Industries dependent on climate conditions such as agriculture, 
fisheries, forestry, health care, tourism, water, real estate and insurance will feel the 
impacts of severe weather conditions. Electric power, oil and gas producers are also 
dependent on climate, thus storms, floods, droughts and rising sea levels have an 
impact on them, too17.
.........................1.3 Criticism of Climate Change
Despite a wide support for the case of climate change, there are some 
research findings that are skeptical about it. First of all, these skeptics, such as Patrick 
J. Michaels and Paul C. Knappenberger, denounce the publication bias, saying that 
IPCC, whose results are used by policymakers, tried to demonstrate that there is a link 
between climate change and negative effects, even though the opposite can be 
scientifically worthy. It is argued that results illustrating that there is no danger in global 
warming do not get published, resulting in overestimation of threats and 
underestimation of immunity to climate change18.
There are a number of issues that the skeptics have come forward with. First, 
they believe that warming due to greenhouse gases is overestimated and that there 
are mistakes in data analysis and thus in temperature records presented by the 
Climate Research Unit at the University of East Anglia, which has been providing IPCC 
with data. Second, it is questioned whether the change rate of sea level is rising, as 
there are studies -  not included by IPCC in its documents - that suggest the observed 
rise is a short-term variation. Third, climate models to predict future changes are under 
attack, as such models are claimed to fail on what they predict. Graph 1 represents the 
findings of climate change skeptics that suggest model incapacity to predict the real trend.
16 Emanuel, K., 'Increasing Destructiveness of tropical cyclones over the past 30 years', Nature 
436(7051), 2005.
17 Labatt, S., Carbon Finance, pp. 11-15.
18 Michaels, P. J.; Knappenberger, PC., 'Scientific Shortcomings in the EPA's Endangerment Finding 
from Greenhouse Gases', Cato Journal Fall, 2009, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj29n3/cj29n3- 
8.pdf>.
Trend length jvsarei
S o u r c e :  Michaels (2009).
Graph 1: The 95% Confidence Range of the Trends in Global 
Temperatures Projected by a Collection of Climate Models, 
along with Observations of the Same Quantity
Fourth, a series of papers suggested that people can adjust to changes and become 
less sensitive: once heat becomes more often, there are fewer victims, therefore with 
further increases of temperature the number of deaths will decline. Also, cities and 
their micro-climates are claimed responsible for big temperature changes, not the 
global warming per se. Fifth, global warming critics do not believe that agricultural 
production will suffer from changing climate, as both people and farmers will adjust to 
the new environment by responding with technologically advanced methods. Sixth, 
C02 should not be grouped with other greenhouse gases as its impact on agricultural 
plants and thus general public welfare is positive. Graph 2 shows US annual crop 
yields from 1895 to 2005. The above mentioned facts represent in the opinion of global 
warming critics a clear case of publication bias and skewed representation of scientific 
information. Such misleading and not fully presented information, as they believe, 
become the basis of political decisions that, in turn, can be disproportionate and fall 
short of the intended outcomes19.
The findings of the climate change skeptics are a valuable contribution to the 
scientific search for truth. We shall, however, fall in line with the international
19 Michaels, P. J., 'Scientific Shortcomings in the EPA’s Endangerment Finding from Greenhouse 
Gases'.
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Graph 2: Historical U.S. Annual Average Yields of Comand Wheat, along with U.S.
Annual Average Temperature and Precipitation
agreement on dangers of climate change, and continue our discussion keeping in mind
the potential risks presented by global warming to societies may be too great for
inaction.
........................ 1.4 Global response
The ongoing debate about the earth's atmosphere has led to a number of 
responses. One the one hand, a big shift in social awareness of climate change is 
under way, most notably expressed in Al Gore's idea of the moral obligation to protect 
the planet from further severe changes. In 'An Inconvenient Truth' he has popularized 
the idea of common responsibility for climate change20. Al Gore's vivid description of 
the future based on current carbon emissions patterns has become part of the political, 
economic and personal agenda, despite criticism and astroturfing.
On the other hand, scientific findings have influenced policy-makers. 
Establishing a carbon price through tax, trading or other type of regulation has been 
proclaimed as an essential foundation for climate change policy. Creating a broadly 
similar carbon price signal around the world, and using carbon finance to accelerate 
action in developing countries have become urgent priorities for international 
cooperation21.
20 Gore, A., An Inconvenient Truth: The Planetary Emergency of Global Warming and What We Can 
Do About It, USA: Rodale 2006.
21 Stern. N.. 'The Stern Review'.
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2 Energy constrained future: fossil fuels as major producers of 
C02
The world is dependent on energy in order to grow and develop. The demand 
for energy is bound to increase as developing countries such as China, India and 
Brazil are bound to require more energy to fuel their economies. In the developed 
world energy consumption is already high and in the foreseen future is not expected to 
drop drastically22.
The major sources of energy today and in the middle-term perspective are 
fossil fuels, primarily oil and gas. These sources, however, have capacity limits and 
thus put a challenge of where to obtain energy from in the long-term perspective. 
World oil production has peaked, whereas natural gas is viewed as a transition fuel of 
choice that can provide the world with energy only for the next 60 years given the 
known world supplies23. The producers of both oil and gas are prone to result in supply 
instability due to cartelized nature of their existence (OPEC, 'Gas OPEC'), political 
instability (rebel activities in Nigeria, Russia-Ukraine contradictions), natural disasters 
(Hurricane Katrina) and operational risks (BP platform destruction in April 2010). Such 
instability of supply is reflected in oil and gas high and volatile prices. Graphs 3 and 4 
illustrate the volatility of both fuels.
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22 Griffin, J.M., A Smart Energy Policy: An Economist's Rx for Balancing Cheap, Clean, and Secure 
Energy, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 2009.
23 Ibid.
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Graph 4: Natural gas historical prices 
Source: www.pointcarbon.com
So how will the energy be produced during the next stage of human 
development? There are essentially four ways.
The first is, quite paradoxically, to go on using fossil fuels from sources that 
before were not economically sensible. Due to oil demand being inelastic, oil prices are 
likely to be quite high in the near future, making it reasonable to invest in complex 
technologies that would, for instance, allow to obtain oil from Canadian or Venezuelan 
oil sands. Recovery methods have seen great technological advances, making used oil 
sites available for continued exploration and oil extraction. These extraction methods 
are energy intensive and produce more C02 than conventional methods, promising to 
compromise carbon reduction attempts24.
It is also possible to go back, where circumstances allow, to the fossil fuel that 
made the modern industrial society possible -  coal. It is cheap, and there is enough 
coal to provide the world with energy for the next 200 years. Yet coal also poses a big 
threat to the carbon-free future, as despite considerable improvements in treating coal 
before combustion as to minimize smog and acidification, it is still the biggest 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter among other fuels25.
24 Griffin, J.M., A Smart Energy Policy.
25 Ibid.
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The second solution to providing the world with energy is expanding nuclear 
and hydro energy. There are a number of problems with both. Nuclear energy has high 
costs associated with capital investment and refurbishment, although recurrent costs 
are lower in comparison to other sources. Disposal of spent fuel is a problem, as it 
remains radioactive for hundreds of thousands of years. Operational safety is a 
danger: although accidents are rare, their aftermath is deadly, causing leukaemia and 
birth defects. Being central to global security, nuclear power is dangerous in a sense 
that obtaining nuclear energy may lead to nuclear weapon programs or terrorist groups 
producing nuclear bombs. As for hydro power, small hydro powers are considered a 
good option, whereas big hydro plants destroy the ecology of the site and often require 
displacement of many people26.
As a preliminary conclusion we can say that the first way of providing the world 
with energy that relies on the use of fossil fuels will result in increased C02 emissions 
and incur all the dangers currently associated with climate change. The second 
solution -  nuclear and hydro -  produces less carbon, but the cement used for building 
nuclear plants and the deforestation caused by large hydro plants do have an impact 
on carbon. Moreover, there are other environmental dangers associated with the two 
methods that increase their cost to the society.
The third way is to use renewables. In an energy constrained world, having 
renewable sources such as biomass, wind, solar, tidal, wave and geothermal energy 
seem very appetizing. Yet they have two major drawbacks: they are either non-reliable, 
or extremely costly27.
The fourth way, as research findings predict, is moving by the middle of the 
twenty first century into a hydrogen economy based on generating hydrogen from a 
range of energy sources, predominantly fossil fuels, with capture and sequestration of 
C02 produced as a result of the conversion processes28.
Quite logically, it seems that moving towards renewables and hydrogen is the
26 Labatt, S., Carbon Finance, pp.39-41.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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most obvious choice. Yet there is also a price issue: making renewables and hydrogen 
technologies competitive requires them to become cheaper, otherwise it would be 
difficult to fight, say, cheap energy produced from coal. What is clear is that something 
has to be done to make these burgeoning technologies mainstream. An important 
insight from the energy sources discussion is that the world needs more energy, and it 
has to be cheap. Since major sources of energy used today are finite, a move towards 
using cheaper, but more polluting technologies is viable. This puts the issue of climate 
change in the spotlight again, requiring further insights into how prices for energy 
sources should be formed and what kind of regulation is needed to make the 
unavoidable transition into a new era of energy generation possible. Throughout the 
rest of the work, as we discuss ways to regulate carbon, we should not lose sight of 
the underlying issue behind the challenge: the energy hungry world that is bound to 
increase its energy consumption. Therefore, in the next section we shall concentrate 
specifically on how prices are and should be formed and how regulation can help 
achieve lower levels of carbon.
3 The cost of action to address climate change: the double dividend 
discourse
It has been widely agreed that in order to tackle climate change the world 
needs to introduce regulatory measures. Using integrated assessment modeling that 
projects trends in consistent manner and assesses costs and benefits of climate 
policies, Nordhaus developed the DICE (Dynamic Integrated Model of Climate and the 
Economy) model, that stipulates that emissions depend of the economy, which, in turn, 
depends on the emissions. The costs of a very strong climate policy has been 
estimated to be between 1 and 3 per cent of gross world product, confronted with 5 to 
10 per cent loss in gross world product in the case of inaction. Nordhaus also presents 
the price of carbon to the society, illustrated in graph 529.
The calculations are based on current prices of available energy sources, 
which might mean that in the future these numbers can be even lower due to a more 
wide use of some burgeoning technologies. This view is supported by the experience
29 Nordhaus,W.D., 'Economic Issues in a Designing a Global Agreement on Global Warming' ( Address 
forClimate Change: Global Risks, Challenges, and Decisions,Copenhagen, Denmark, 2009) 
<http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/documents/Copenhagen_052909.pdf>.
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with the US cap-and-trade program for acid rain which resulted in cost below the initial 
predictions30.
Apart from addressing the problem of climate change at a lower cost than 
doing nothing, regulatory measures appear to have a 'second dividend'. Harvard 
economist Michael Porter suggested that environmental regulation can have a positive 
effect of generating more innovation and improved competitiveness31. The 'Porter 
hypothesis' argues that once businesses are under severe pressure from regulators, 
they shall 'ruthlessly' pursue improvements, increasing competitiveness. Moreover, 
having strong domestic competitors businesses will become stronger on the world 
market as well. Porter makes a number of recommendations on how to achieve this 
additional benefit. In his view, promoting predetermined technologies typical of 
command-and-control methods is a dead-end method, whereas giving market 
incentives is highly beneficial. The more watered down version of the 'Porter 
hypothesis' is the notion of double dividend, which substitutes competitiveness with a 
general notion of social welfare, which is still a valid argument for the use of climate 
change policies32. The Stern Report supports this view by claiming that a low-carbon
30 Krugman.P., 'Building a Green Economy', (para. 36 of 81).
31 Porter, M., The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York: The Free Press1998.
32 van der Linde, C.,'The micro-economic implications of environmental regulation: a preliminary framework1, in 
OECD, Environmental Policies and Industrial Competitiveness, Paris: OECD, 1993, pp.69-77.
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economy will bring opportunities for growth33.
In the first chapter we have seen that according to a number o f prominent 
scientific studies climate change is threatening the earth's atmosphere and promises 
to make world economy shrink. That made us arrive at the conclusion that the use of 
regulatory measures in order to reduce carbon is projected to require less economic 
loss than not taking any action. Further we have looked at the double dividend 
argument suggesting that competitiveness and increased social welfare are the 
probable companions o f regulatory action.
33 Stern, N., 'The Stern Review'.
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Chapter 2. Responding to Climate Change
In this chapter we shall look at the existing options for reducing carbon 
footprint. First, we'll discuss possible technological changes together with implications 
and limitations they may have on combating climate change. Second, we shall discuss 
the theory behind market-based approach for carbon reductions and take a detailed 
look at the concepts of negative externalities, carbon taxation, cap-and-trade and 
voluntary markets.
1 Technological progress
A question often asked by economists and policymakers alike is 'What 
happens if technological change is more rapid then we are used to believe?' It is a 
valid question, yet it is rather rhetorical and in order for the science to make a great 
leap into the green future it needs to have the right incentives to do so.
In the first chapter we have already looked at the issue of pursuing alternative 
methods of energy generation. Indeed, there is a number of emerging and very 
promising technologies that have proven to be very efficient. Such emerging 
technologies include the use of LNG, ethanol, hybrid gasoline-electric vehicles, 
hydrogen-powered vehicles, carbon fibers that reduce vehicle weight associated with 
gasoline consumption, biomass fuels based on ethanol produced from wheat and rice 
straw, photovoltaic and solar cells and carbon sequestration to name just the major 
ones. They all have been proven to reduce GHGs, but at the same time they have all 
proven to be a lot more expensive than traditional fossil fuels that, as estimates 
suggest, are still in abundance due to new technologies capable of extracting more 
energy per a unit of most fuels. When oil prices peaked in the period from 2004 to 
2008 - oil being the fuel of choice in the biggest economy of the world, the US - 
alternative sources of energy became more feasible due to a diminishing cost gap. Yet 
the history of oil is all about its volatility, making it impossible to secure profitability of 
new technologies without further support34.
34 Griffin, J.M., A Smart Energy Policy.
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Under technology incentives some researchers see subsidies that are referred 
to as 'beauty pageants’ that end up in preferential treatment of some technologies and 
oblivion of others. If a new disruptive technology appears it might have to fight against 
existing subsidies35. For example, solar panels have received vast support due to 
government incentives in California, Germany and Spain36, yet they might not 
represent the ultimate solution.
This leads us to the discussion of how to provide the needed incentives and 
the needed support to make emerging technologies affordable.
2 Carbon as a negative externality: theoretical grounds for carbon 
markets.
The environmental cost of using certain types of fuels, such as, for instance, 
coal, has not been included in the price that the consumer pays. The market price for a 
unit of coal, one of the worst polluters from the menu of fossil fuels available today, is 
less than that of a unit of natural gas, which, when used in a new natural-gas-fired 
power plants emits one-third of the carbon dioxide. This is a classical example of a 
negative externality, where there is a high societal cost related to the use of certain 
types of fossil fuels. Dirty air and water, deteriorated health and worsened well-being is 
the price the society must pay for not considering the cost of carbon37.
Ideas about how to intervene and how to make human activities cleaner have 
developed over the last few decades. One of the suggestions has been to use 
command-and-control methods, such as prohibition or setting standards. This was 
successfully done in the US in the 90s when factories were required to dump less 
hazardous substances into the water and cars were required to meet emission 
standards38.
35 Griffin, J.M., A Smart Energy Policy.
36 The rise of Big Solar', The Economist, 15.04, 2010 <http://www.economist.com/business- 
finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15911021 > [accessed 1 May 2010],
37 Griffin, J.M., A Smart Energy Policy.
38 Krugman.P., 'Building a Green Economy', (para. 9 of 81).
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However, standards and prohibition practices do not work everywhere. When it 
comes to carbon that can be produced in a variety of ways, prohibiting it or trying to 
introduce a standard becomes challenging. The alternative came in a form of a market- 
based solution suggesting creation of a price for carbon. Those who emit more get 
punished monetarily, whereas those who manage to emit less receive monetary gains. 
This paves the way to carbon-low technologies that can thrive given their ability to 
spend less on carbon despite the initial investment into it39.
3 Market instruments: carbon taxation and cap-and-trade
There are a number of ways in which carbon can receive its price: 
governments can either introduce a tax on GHG emissions, or they can make carbon a 
unit of property that can be exchanged. Here the two alternatives -  carbon taxation 
and cap-and-trade systems - are looked at in more detail.
.........................3.1 Carbon taxation
The father of environmental economics Arthur Cecil Pigou discussed the issue
of negative externalities in The Economics of Welfare' published in 1920. He 
suggested that economic activities should not always be banned, but discouraged by 
setting a price, so that people who produce negative externalities pay for them in 
proportion to the damage. This type of payment is known as pigovian tax and is 
credited with laying the foundations of market-based environmental economics40.
The idea of introducing taxation is much favoured by the economists, who talk 
a lot about making it a steadily rising carbon tax. A steadily rising carbon tax is a 
gradually increasing price that a governing authority sets on the GHG emitted from
using fossil fuels. It has a number of benefits that help effectively incorporate the
environmental cost paid by the society into the price of fossil fuels41.
39 Krugman,P., 'Building a Green Economy’, (para. 10 of 81).
40 Ibid. para.11.
41 Griffin, J.M., A Smart Energy Policy.
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First, such carbon tax creates transparency by treating all GHG emitters 
equally. What you emit is what you pay for. Any new disruptive technology that appears 
on the market can enter the playing ground and pay for its emissions on the same 
terms as all others42.
Second, carbon taxes are traceable and predictable. One can compare the 
taxes paid in the past and can make pretty straightforward conclusions about the future 
carbon expenditures. It also means that taxes resolve the issue of carbon tax volatility 
typical of cap-and-trade system. Once the tax growth is established, businesses know 
exactly how much they will pay and hence can plan well in advance. This allows 
investors to feel more secure about the future of their projects and to choose greener 
options with more confidence43.
Third, introducing a tax is a relatively cheap option. Political and industrial 
tensions apart, introducing a tax doesn't require as many institutions and regulatory 
bodies, consultations, allocation plan approvals or worries about future uncertainties. 
Many countries, including developing nations such as China and India, can embrace it 
quickly and effectively without spending millions on figuring out how to set up a cap- 
and-trade44.
Fourth, it is the market that tells the winning technology, not officials who might 
be interested in promoting or subsidizing a technology of their choice, as the case has 
been with 'beauty pageants' characterized by pouring lots of money in a certain 
technology. Such spending might reflect interests of lobby groups and not the interest 
of effectively curbing carbon emissions. Taxes can open up the way to technologies 
that might otherwise be doomed to a failure due to a much bigger financial support of 
their rivals45.
Fifth, governments can receive an additional source of income that can be 
channelled towards other means.46
42 Griffin, J.M., A Smart Energy Policy.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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Sixth, government authorities can have a firmer grip on the total level of 
emissions by regulating the price, in this way achieving their international commitments 
of reducing carbon.
Seventh, carbon tax embraces all the carbon produced in the economy, not 
just some sectors as it is the case with the cap-and-trade47.
However, taxes set taxpayers' alarms ringing as well as cause industrial lobby 
groups to oppose them. The solution offered to counterbalance this negative 
perception of a tax is to offer a revenue-neutral scheme which would reduce other 
taxes, such as income and payroll taxes and in this way re-establish the lost welfare48.
Despite the scarcity of examples of carbon tax implementation, there is 
evidence from a number of EU countries -  Denmark, Sweden, Germany, The 
Netherlands and the UK - that have introduced a tax on carbon. The outcomes of the 
Energy-Environment-Economy model for Europe, E3ME, that analyzed carbon taxation 
regimes in these countries has shown that GHG were reduced by 4-6 per cent from 
mid-1990s to 2004 in comparison to what would have happened without the tax under 
the BAU conditions49.
47 Griffin, J.M., A Smart Energy Policy, p.50
48 Ibid.
49 Barker, T.; Junankar, S.; Pollitt, H.; Summerton, P., The Effects of Environmental Tax Reform on 
International Competitiveness in the European Union: Modelling with E3ME, Carbon-Energy 
Taxation. Lessons from Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009, pp.147-236
32
3.2 Cap-and-trade
Another way of limiting the behaviour of parties that create negative 
externalities is, again, giving them a right to pollute, but under a certain limit. Licenses 
to pollute are distributed among participants along with a total cap set on how much 
they can pollute collectively. This approach is called cap-and-trade. Business that 
produce more carbon than allowed can buy additional license on the market, whereas 
those who have more licenses than needed can sell them at profit. It gives everyone 
an incentive to pollute less and look for the most efficient way of reducing emissions: 
buyers would need to cut back in order to spend less, whereas sellers would cut back 
in order to sell more50.
The foundation for this approach was provided by the argument that Coase 
made in his famous article The problem of social cost', where he states that 
assignment of property rights would allow the trade of environmental endowments in 
order to achieve an economically efficient outcome51. Market failure would be 
corrected without the use of cost-internalizing pigovian taxes and everyone would have 
an incentive to emit less52.
The US in 1990 was the first to test the Coase's idea in the environmental 
sphere by initiating the Acid Rain Program under the Clean Air Act that introduced a 
cap-and-trade system in which power plants could trade the right to emit sulphur 
dioxide under a limit. The program successfully reduced sulphur dioxide emissions by 
power stations at a cost inferior to that expected or offered by alternatives policies. 
Instead of rising, electricity prices fell down53.
Once a market for carbon is created, carbon exchanges can take place in the 
most efficient way, achieving equilibrium. The bigger the market, the more matches are 
found, increasing the efficiency of emission cuts. The market aggregates the
50 Krugman.P., 'Building a Green Economy', (para. 27 of 81).
51 Coase, R., 'The Problem of Social Cost', Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1), 1960, pp.1-44.
52 Ellerman, A. D.; Convery, R J.; de Perthuis, C., Pricing Carbon. The European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009.p.13.
53 Ellerman, A.D.; Joskow, P.L.; Schmalensee, R.; Montero, J.-R; Bailey, E.M., Markets for clean air: 
The US Acid Rain Program, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000.
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information about carbon price and signals it to those who have to make a decision on 
how much to pollute54.
In practice, breathing life into a carbon market means creating emission 
permits, or credits, that can be bought and sold. These carbon credits represent a 
reduction of GHG equal to one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent, tC02e, that 
can actually consist of different proportions of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
sulphur hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons, and perfuorocarbons55.
Cap-and-trade has a number of benefits. First, credits, unless they are 
auctioned, constitute a compensation that industries receive for participating in the 
scheme: freely distributed property rights have a monetary equivalent that is captured 
by the business. Consequently, it is not the government that just gets the cash, but 
businesses that get rewarded56.
Second, the market created through cap-and-trade also allows to overcome 
geographical and temporal boundaries, making it possible for carbon property 
exchanges between nations (if such system is set)57.
Third, a cap-and-trade carbon market allows participation of a broader number 
of players, giving arbitrage opportunities to speculators and environmental groups who 
might want to try to drive the cost up58.
Fourth, cap-and-trade is a politically more digestible solution, as it has proven 
to be difficult to introduce carbon taxation into legislation. Both the EU and the United 
States were in favor of introducing a tax: both of them had to go for the cap-and-trade 
option instead. The EU has the system in place, whereas the US senate is only 
preparing for the cap-and-trade to be introduced in 2013 as foreseen in the Kerry- 
Lieberman bill.
54 Bayon, R.; Hawn, A.; Hamilton, K., Voluntary Carbon Markets: An International Business Guide to 
What They Are and How They Work (Environmental Market Insights), UK and US: Earthscan 2009, 
p.25.
55 Ibid.
56 Krugman.P., 'Building a Green Economy', (para. 30 of 81).
57 Bayon, R., Voluntary Carbon Markets', p.26.
58 Ibid.
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3.2.1 Distribution of emission credits
Emission credits can be distributed in a number of ways. They can be 
distributed for free by a regulator in a form of allowances on the basis of either 
grandfathering or benchmarking. They can also be auctioned, generating revenues 
for the government.
Grandfathering means granting some quantity of free allowances to 
installations on the basis of their historical emissions. Installations get the right to emit 
because they used to emit before. To some, this argument does not pass the moral 
test, yet it is completely in line with the logic of mitigating the negative externalities 
problem -  letting installations continue with their practices, yet giving them an incentive 
to do it less59.
Benchmarking means, again, granting some quantity of free allowances to 
installations, but using a specific efficiency criteria, rewarding those that are energy- 
efficient and penalizing those who are not. The decision is still made based on 
historical emissions, yet the 'best' emitters are used as benchmark setters. It is also 
argued that finding the right benchmark is very costly due to the heterogeneous nature 
of products. Practical benchmarking would mean coming up with hundreds of 
benchmarks for a wide variety of products. This last point is open to debate as, for 
instance, the US in 1990 introduced a clear S02 benchmarking that gave positive 
results60.
Auctioning is another way to distribute credits, which allows to form the price 
through trading the necessary amount of permits. It is argued that auctioning acts in 
the same act as taxes, bringing revenues to the issuing authorities61.
59 Bayon, R.,Voluntary Carbon Markets', p.50.
60 Ellerman, Pricing Carbon, p.64-67.
61 Ekins, P.; Barker, T., 'Carbon taxes and carbon emission trading', Journal of Economic Surveys, 
15/3, 2001, p.76.
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.........................3.3 Tax and cap-and-trade: similarities and
differences
The incentives that a cap-and-trade system produces have the same economic 
result as the pigovian tax, with the price of licenses effectively serving as a tax on 
pollution. However the two systems address two different uncertainties: the tax 
regulates the price, and not the quantity, whereas the cap-and-trade system regulates 
the quantity, and not the price62.
As argued by Ekins, attempts to fix both the price and the quantity will fail in 
any market. The abatement adjusts to either of the parameters. It is a function of either 
the price or the quantity63.
As for choosing one type or another, Weitzman suggests two scenarios. First, 
if the abatement is going to happen to such an extent that emissions are reduced to a 
level greater than optimal, it is advised to use tax. Second, if the damage caused is 
projected to be greater than the optimal level, i.e. exceeds the 'tipping point', than a 
cap-and-trade system should be used64.
4 Voluntary carbon market 
 4.1 The concept
Whereas taxing carbon and creating a cap-and-trade systems are compliance 
measures aimed at reducing C02 levels in the atmosphere, voluntary carbon market is 
something that is more closely related to taking the moral duty of reducing carbon. 
Individuals and organizations voluntary buy emission reduction credits to reduce their 
net carbon emissions. This transactions take place either informally, or via a formal 
exchange65.
62 Krugman.P, 'Building a Green Economy', (para. 22 of 81).
63 Ekins,P.,'Carbon Taxes and Emissions Trading:lssues and Interactions' in Carbon-Energy Taxation. 
Lessons from Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 248.
64 Weitzman, M.L., 'Prices vs.Quantities', Review of Econmic Studies, 41, 1974, p.91.
65 Bayon, R., Voluntary Carbon Markets'.
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The idea behind voluntary carbon market is pretty straightforward. Nature 
conservation and carbon reduction projects have good ideas that can help reduce 
carbon, but they do not have the resources to sponsor them. Consequently, these 
projects can calculate how much C02 they are likely to take away from the 
atmosphere and sell it to an entity that would like to offset its own emissions. A carbon- 
neutral deal is stricken, where the emitter pays the project money to carry out the 
idea66.
The mechanism described is not a novelty, it already exists under the Kyoto 
Protocol and is known as Clean Development Programme (CDM), that will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. In fact, voluntary carbon market is a 
parallel world of the United Nations Clean Development Programme. Voluntary market 
allows highly innovative, flexible and less expensive projects to happen at a lower 
transaction cost. While the nature of projects is the same -  neutralizing carbon 
footprint, they do not carry the cost associated with the bureaucracy of being accepted 
by the UN CDM Executive Board, which increases the upfront costs of carbon 
reduction projects by 12-22 per cent. Emitters who would like to neutralize their 
emissions but are not regulated to do so can opt for voluntary carbon market projects 
to reduce costs. Virtually anyone can contribute to the reduction of carbon and benefit 
from it -  corporations, governments and individuals67.
We believe that this new development in the world of carbon can definitely be 
considered as yet another regulation tool. Although the initiative does not come from 
an established institution or government, it allows to mitigate the effects of climate 
change, thus making it a valid instrument. No doubt that it is not only the morals that 
drive this segment of the carbon market. As it develops, voluntary carbon attracts 
investors, insurers and speculators, creating sophisticated financial vehicles aimed at 
creating value. This grass root happening that with time acquired all the elements and 
incentives of business is a method in itself, complementing the compliance taxation 
and cap-and-trade.
66 Bayon, R., Voluntary Carbon Markets'.
67 Ibid. pp.15-16.
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4.2 Historical development
The origin of the voluntary approach is in the United States that for a long time 
was promoting emission trading, but then refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Given 
the fact that the country was ready to go for a market for emissions but lacked political 
impulse to make it compulsory, voluntary measures emerged68. The EU, despite 
compulsory carbon regulation system in place, accounts for 47 per cent of buyer 
transactions in the voluntary markets69.
Voluntary market is maturing quickly, with transactions reaching 2 per cent of 
the volume of the Kyoto markets in 2007, when 42.1 million tonnes of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (MtC02e) were traded on the OTC market coupled with further 22.9 
MtC02e transacted on the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX). The total volume of the 
voluntary carbon market reached 65 MtC02e70.
.........................4.3 Reasons for businesses to be interested
Businesses have quite a number of opportunities for improved performance in 
case they neutralize their emissions, making participation in the voluntary carbon 
market advantageous.
First, by buying offsets on the voluntary markets corporations can reach their 
corporate responsibility targets and increase their public image. Since the costs of 
such offsets are significantly lower than those acquired through the UN CDM, 
corporations can achieve savings while bolstering their image.
Second, by acquiring emission credits companies can improve their branding 
by claiming their products to be green. They can therefore enjoy increased sales by 
targeting green-minded individuals.
Third, investors can buy offsets on the voluntary market for a relatively small
68 Ellerman, A. D., Pricing Carbon, p.14.
69 Bayon, R., Voluntary Carbon Markets’, p.50.
70 Hamilton, K.; Sjardin, M.; Marcello, T.; Xu, G., 'Forging a Frontier: State of the Voluntary Carbon 
Markets 2008', Ecosystem Marketplace & New Carbon Finance, 2008.
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price with the intention of selling them for a higher price in the future.
Fourth, voluntary market is an exercise ground for future compliance legislation 
-  companies can test their readiness for the new environmental demands if the latter 
are not yet in place71.
........................ 4.4 Proof of the second dividend argument
The voluntary nature of neutralizing emissions and an existing demand for it 
empirically supports the 'second dividend' argument as it effectively creates such 
benefits to the actors that are not only related to stopping climate change, but also 
create other benefits such as increased competitiveness of the businesses who 
employ them and making economy grow through creating a new sector and jobs.
.........................4.5 Functionality
Most voluntary carbon market operations go through four stages. First, the 
product is created or an idea generated. This can be done by virtually any person or 
any organization that can prove that their project will result in biodiversity, local 
community development or GHG reductions72.
Second, the product should be verified. As there are CERs (Certified Emission 
Reduction) in compliance markets, there are VERs (Voluntary Emission Reduction) on 
the voluntary market73.
There are many companies that have seized the opportunity of the voluntary 
market and they have developed trading and verification tools that allow them to 
manage VERs and related transaction. Examples of the most successful players are 
CarbonNeutral company, MyClimate, Gold Standard, Voluntary Carbon Standard etc74.
During the third stage the product is distributed. It can be done either through 
retailers or wholesalers, or on an exchange. Retailers target individual byers, very 
often via Internet shops. As of today, there are about 200 suppliers of projects on the
71 Hamilton, 'Forging a Frontier'.
72 Bayon, R.,Voluntary Carbon Markets', p.50.
73 Ibid. p.56.
74 Ibid. p.57.
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market. Wholesalers and brokers, who don't own credits, trade non-standardized 
products. Exchanges, such CCX, Asia Carbon Exchange, Green Exchange and 
Climex, sell both compliance market products and VERs75.
During the fourth stage the product is consumed by individuals, institutions or 
other ecology-driven entities. For instance, the pioneer of voluntary carbon reduction 
AES Corp, an American electricity company, invested in 1989 in an agroforestry project 
in Guatemala. HSBC bought 170,000 tons of carbon in 2005 to make its operations 
carbon-neutral76.
Criteria for validating voluntary projects:
Additionality -  the project must create reductions over and beyond a 
business-as-usual scenario, and there must be some assurance that the 
project would not occur without the funding provided by carbon credits
-  Permanence -  the project must guarantee GHG mitigation over the 
stated time period. For instance, a proof that fire will not destroy forests or 
carbon stored underground will not be released in the atmosphere
Leakage -  the project must not transfer emissions to another location 
outside the project area
-  Double counting of emissions should be excluded 
Source: Hamilton,Forging a Frontier
Voluntary carbon market has its downsides, too. Since there is no legal 
obligation to offset emissions, there is lack of uniformity, questionable transparency 
and volatility of demand. The market share is very small, thus it only contributes, not 
resolves the problem of climate change.
In chapter three we discussed the potential that emerging technologies have to 
contribute towards mitigating climate change. We have seen that these new
75 Bayon, R.Voluntary Carbon Markets', pp.19-35.
76 Ibid.
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technologies need the right incentives and support in order to be implemented, which 
lead us to the discussion o f ways carbon can be regulated. Thus, we looked at carbon 
as a classical example o f a negative externality that can be tackled in a number of 
ways -  through command-and control methods or through market-based approach. 
We concentrated out attention on the latter, discussing carbon taxation and cap-and- 
trade systems. We saw/ that although they regulate two different uncertainties -  carbon 
price and carbon quantity - they both can achieve the same economic outcome. The 
two systems have their positive and negative sides, and have examples of successful 
implementation across the world. We have also noticed that cap-and-trade system can 
have different schemes o f permit allocation, allowing grandfathering, benchmarking 
and auctioning (in the case of which the revenues can be considered as a tax). The 
part about voluntary carbon market was discussed in order to see alternative, non- 
compliance type developments in the world o f carbon, giving an insight into how 
reducing carbon can actually benefit businesses, finding empirical support for the 
'second dividend' argument.
An important insight has been that o f political feasibility o f carbon taxation. 
Since converting the taxation idea into legislation has proven to be a challenge, we 
shall assume in the next chapters that cap-and-trade is the most functional option at 
this stage o f the carbon regulation development.
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Chapter 3. International regimes 
regulating global warming
This chapter will discuss the need for international response to global warming 
and look at the existing international regimes, such Kyoto Protocol and its provisions, 
as well as an introductory overlook of the block-lead EU ETS. We shall discuss the 
Copenhagen Summit results and potential threats to global climate change 
cooperation.
1 The need for international response
The moral obligation to save the planet coupled with predictions of huge 
economic costs related to global warming have entered into the political agenda and 
made the advances in environmental legislation on the global level feasible. However, 
reaching a consensus on the distant future with high expenditures upfront is a titanic 
task as policymakers do not view future gains as much as the present ones77. 
Moreover, there is a risk of free-riding for participants of all-inclusive approaches, non­
participation being a rational choice if countries are to follow their self-interest78.
In order for any international accord to function there must be a monitoring 
institution enforcing it, as was the case with the successfully implemented SOx cap- 
and-trade experiment in the US. Binding emission targets and strict compliance 
timetables have to be introduced and enforced. Another prerequisite is to provide 
financial help and incentives to those less able to cooperate, i.e. developing nations 
lacking resources to initiate a major program addressing global warming79.
Theoretically, there are a number of approaches available as a basis for an 
international regime. The first is to commit all nations to participate and share the 
burden. We shall see that this was the foundation for the Kyoto Protocol that tried to 
bring most nations to signing it. However, as we already said all-inclusive systems 
stimulate free-riding, making it necessary to add more 'carrots' for everyone to
77 Griffin, J.M., A Smart Energy Policy, p.50
78 Ibid, p.50.
79 Ibid. p.60.
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contribute -  compensating those who oppose it for joining in80.
Another method is a so-called 'club approach' that would include only a 
number of countries that commit themselves to binding targets. Signs of the practical 
realization of these ideas are already there. The EU has agreed to reduce its carbon 
footprint by introducing the EU ETS regime that effectively puts limits on a 'club' of 
nations81.
2 Kyoto Protocol
The first international effort to understand climate change was made in 1988 
when the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) established the Intergovernmental Panel of 
Climate Change (IPCC). IPCC reviews the most recent scientific data provided by the 
scientist who contribute on a voluntary basis and makes predictions about the future 
trends in climate change. IPCC made it first assessment in 1990, and the latest 
available report, Climate Change 2007, estimates that at a 1 to 2°C increase in global 
mean temperature above 1990 levels (about 1.5 to 2.5°C above pre-industrial levels) 
there is an increased risk to unique and threatened systems such as polar and high 
mountain communities and ecosystems, risk of extreme weather events, unequal 
distribution of impacts and vulnerabilities between regions and increasing sea level82.
Having chosen an increase in temperature of 2°C as the maximum 'safe' level, 
189 countries met in 1992 at the 'Earth Summit 'in Rio de Janeiro, making voluntary 
commitments to address climate change by agreeing on the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). Although mitigation policies as well as adaptation 
measures were discussed, the Convention did little to establish firm governmental 
targets83.
The next step came during the third UNFCCC Conference in Kyoto, when in 
1997 the Kyoto Protocol was signed, committing 'Annex 1' countries that include 37 
industrialized nations, to carry out mandatory reductions of GHG emissions of 5.2 per
80 Griffin, J.M., A Smart Energy Policy, p.65.
81 Ibid., p.150.
82 IPCC: <http://www.ipcc.ch/oraanization/oraanization.htm>.
83 Allianz AG and WWF International, 'Climate Change and the Financial Sector: An Agenda for Action', 
Gland: Allianz AG Munich and WWF International, 2005.
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cent from 1990 level by the end of 2012. Other countries, such as India and China, 
joined the protocol without binding targets.
The protocol had to be ratified by at least 55 countries to be legally binding. 
The ratification happened in 2005, when Russia finally joined in, amid continuing 
opposition to it from the US and Australia (which ratified it in 2007).
The Kyoto Protocol established the First Commitment Period from 2008 to
2012. The provisions of the protocol do not say how emission reductions should be 
made. Yet it offers three mechanisms for the Annex 1 countries to choose from: 
emission trading schemes (ETS), Joint Implementation (Jl), and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM)84.
The first element of the system, emissions trading, is the cap-and-trade system 
we discussed in the previous chapter. It gives GHG caps to participating countries, 
which then distribute it among businesses within their respective jurisdictions. The 
desired result is to trade carbon credits, called assigned amount units (AAUs) 
between each other in order to meet Kyoto commitments.
The additional mechanisms are Joint Implementation(JI) and Clean 
Development Mechanism(CDM). Both are project-based transaction systems, but 
participants differ.
Under a Jl project developed countries can purchase carbon credits, called 
Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), from GHG reduction projects implemented in 
another developed of transition country (specifically the former Soviet Union). The 
market for Jl is worth US$499 million and trades about 41 million tonnes (Mt) of carbon 
as of 200885. ERUs can be issued for emission reductions occurring in 2008 or later86.
84 UNFCCC:<http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php>.
85 Capoor, K.; Ambrosi, P., 'State and Trends of the Carbon Market', Wahington, DC: World Bank,
2008.
86 Ellerman, A. D., Pricing Carbon, p.13.
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Graph 6: Potential ERU supply by country until 2012 
Source Ellerman, Pricing Carbon, p. 284.
Graph 6 illustrates the potential ERU supply by country until 2012, explicitly 
showing that transition countries, such as Russia and Ukraine, are net contributers.
Graph 7: Estimated CER supply by country until 2012 
Source: Ellerman, Pricing Carbon, p. 281.
Under CDM, developed countries can finance carbon reductions in developing
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countries and receive carbon offsets called Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs). 
The market for CDM as of 2007 was estimated at over US$12 billion and trades 551 
Mt of C02e87. CERs can be derived from emission reductions occurring from as early 
as 2000. Graph 7 shows which countries produce CERs.
As we saw earlier, voluntary market transactions with VERs happen the same 
way as at CERs, neutralizing carbon emissions through offsets.
3 Challenges to international cooperation
Kyoto Protocol provides decent guidance on how to address climate change, 
yet as we shall see it is only the EU that actually contributing largely to the set targets, 
being the only block of countries that embraced the cap-and-trade mechanism and 
made it obligatory. Some countries are benefiting from the CDM and Jl projects, yet 
the future of international cooperation is at risk. The most recent example proving the 
weakness of international negotiations is the 2009 Copenhagen Summit that failed to 
design the future of the post Kyoto world, undermining all the achievements that have 
been made in the last 13 years.
First, it failed to secure the future of carbon trading, with EU ETS being a role 
model. What was hoped by the participants of the Copenhagen Summit is that carbon 
trading would receive support and be accepted as a scheme to stop climate change for 
the rest of the world, effectively creating a world carbon market. Instead, the summit 
made carbon trade lose its momentum as the US, Japan and Australia are still not part 
of the scheme. The market created by the EU ETS is already quite mature and needs 
growth from expansion into other continents88.
Second, it made the existing carbon market shrink. CDM projects that form 
part of the carbon trading scheme are on the brink of extinction as their future is not 
clear after 2012. Investors, such as environmental financial companies, raise money
87 Ellerman, A. D., Pricing Carbon, p.284.
88 Gardiner, B., 'Lack of Direction on Climate Change Hobbles Carbon Trading', The New York Times,
15.02, 2010 <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/15/business/energy-environment/15rentrade.html> 
[accessed 30 April 2010] (para. 5 of 24).
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through public offering or from pension funds in order to invest in CDMs and then sell 
the offsets produced for profit in Europe. Since CDM projects may last for a number of 
years, not knowing what will happen with the whole scheme after 2012 makes 
investors in CDMs abandon their projects. As a result, new investments fell by 30 to 40 
per cent in 2009, whereas 2010 has seen another 40-50 per cent shrink89.
Third, the summit failed to secure future reductions of carbon. Although it 
recognized the scientific case for keeping temperature rises to no more than 2°C, the 
final document did not contain commitments to emissions reductions to achieve that 
objective. The goal of reducing global C02 emissions by 80% by 2050 was dropped90.
Fourth, developing nations were not made to commit to the climate change 
agenda. The Copenhagen Summit agreed to provide $30bn a year for poor countries 
to adapt to climate change from 2010 to 2012, and $100bn a year by 2020. However 
developing nations are no obliged to make any cuts in their emissions91.
As we have seen, there are numerous challenges that the world community is 
faced with. Kyoto Protocol has not become the beacon of change, Copenhagen 
negotiations did not bring the aspired results, and the whole CDM and Jl projects are 
at risk. However, the EU ETS system is at place and it promises to contribute a lot to 
the development of carbon regulation, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
In this chapter we have looked at the possible options of international 
cooperation and discussed in detail the coming of age o f the Kyoto Protocol and its 
provisions. We have also identified challenges to further cooperation and the risks they 
present. We believe that this has set the right preparatory framework for discussing the 
EU ETS, its functionality and challenges in the following chapters.
89 Gardiner, B., 'Lack of Direction',(para. 14 of 24).
90 Vidal, J.;Stratton, A.; Goldenberg, S., 'LowTargets, Goals Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in Failure', 
The Guardian (London) 19.12, 2009
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-dealRetrieved> [accessed 22 
April 2010] (para. 2 of 18).
91 Vidal, J., 'Low Targets, Goals Dropped', (para. 8 of 18).
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Chapter 4. The EU carbon policy
In this chapter we shall concentrate entirely on the EU ETS scheme, its 
coming to life, its major phases and provisions for future improvements. We shall 
discuss how allocation methods influence the outcomes and how auctioning can 
correct present failures. We shall see how the EU ETS is connected to the Kyoto 
Protocol through CDMs and Jls. We shall then conclude by looking both at criticism 
and praise of the system.
1 EU flagship role in implementing market-based regulation
The EU has been the first to grasp the need for major change in carbon 
legislation. Even before the Kyoto Protocol was ratified in 2005, the EU already agreed 
on meeting the emission target of 8 per cent reduction below 1990 levels in the period 
from 2008-2012. The EU ETS has become the first and the largest international 
emissions trading scheme in the world. The official policy of the EU is to stabilize the 
global temperature increase at 2 degrees, which is considered a realistic number to bid 
for92. As it becomes clear from table 2, most of the carbon trading is happening in the 
EU, and most of it is due to emissions trading, CDMs constituting a small part of the 
overall trade.
Carbon market 2005 -  2008 (Estimate)
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Table 2: http://www.wto. org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/wksp_goods_sept09je/mani_e.pdf
92 Andersen, M.S., Carbon Energy Taxation, p. 6.
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EU ETS covers 40 per cent of all European greenhouse gas emissions, 
covering electricity producing facilities and energy-intensive manufactures. The system 
is also supported by product efficiency measures that stimulate producers towards 
lower-carbon future. Initially EU ETS covered 11 per cent of emission from developing 
nations and 4 per cent worldwide93.
........................ 1.1 Carbon taxes vs. cap-and-trade
Cap-and-trade mechanism chosen by the EU is considered the result of two 
failures: a failure to introduce carbon taxation first on the EU, and then on the 
international level during the Kyoto negotiations. Indeed, the first policy of choice for 
the EU was introducing an EU-wide carbon tax in 199294. This met with two kinds of 
obstacles - the fiscal autonomy of states vis-a-vis the Commission, and industrial lobby 
opposition within the member states. The EU members didn't want to cease tax- 
raising, although of only one environmentally-friendly type, to the Commission. Since 
fiscal matters are decided unanimously, there was no hope for a carbon tax legislation 
to pass on the EU level. The second reason why introducing a carbon tax was not 
plausible was because of the opposition from industry lobbies that feared increasing 
production costs and demanding new rules. As a result of these factors the idea to 
have a tax on carbon was scraped in 199795.
This gave way to theories suggesting the use of cap-and-trade. The idea to 
employ emission trading to help the EU towards climate change was first voiced by 
Klaassen (1997) and later developed by Sorrell and Skea (1999). As a result of the 
intellectual developments in this field, in 1998 the Burden Sharing Agreement (BSA) 
came to life, setting the target of 8 per cent below 1990 by 2008-2012 period, 
corresponding to the Kyoto requirements. Although for a long time, including during the 
Kyoto negotiations, the EU opposed emissions trading, it eventually accepted this path 
as a means of regulating carbon. This happened due to the fact that Kyoto Protocol did 
not provide any legal sanctions for non-compliance of its participants, and thus the EU 
opted for a 'domestic' scheme underpinned by the European Court of Justice96.
93 Ellerman, A. D., Pricing Carbon, p.260.
94 European Commission. Proposal for a Council Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions and Energy, COM(92) 226 final. Brussels: European Commission, 1992.
95 Ellerman, A. D., Pricing Carbon, p.16.
96 Ibid.
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The EU could rely on the experience of its member states that already had 
emission trading schemes in place. The UK introduced both a cap-and-trade system 
and sector-based intensity targets in 2002 that was voluntary and included £30 million 
as incentive payments for installations. Denmark from 2001 had an emission cap 
system in place for its electricity sector. Starting from the year 2000 The Netherlands, 
Sweden, Germany and France discussed the introduction of emission trading 
schemes. Such enthusiasm for emission trading came from the industries that tried to 
avoid taxes at any cost. These developments, promising to create a patchwork of local 
regulations across Europe prompted a wide support for market instruments for the 
whole EU97.
2 EU ETS goes into life
In 2003 the Emission Trading Directive was issued, and on 1 January 2005 the 
trading commenced. The first 'pilot' period lasted from 2005 to 2007 and focused on 
power generation and industries, accounting for 40 per cent of total GHG emissions. 
Using carbon sinks such as forestry projects was not allowed. Member states had to 
come up with a national allocation plan (NAP) and through this in a decentralized 
manner they were assigned European Union Allowances (EUAs) based on historical 
emissions. The Commission had to approve the decisions of national states and also 
register all the transactions via the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL). 
Emitters who exceeded their allowances had to automatically pay a penalty worth €40 
per EUA for non-compliance. The EU later linked its ETS programme with Kyoto 
targets by issuing in 2004 the Linking Directive which allowed the use of certified 
emission reductions (CERs) deriving from the Clean Development Mechanism from 
2005 and Joint Implementation credits from 2008. In 2010 the EU ETS accounted for 
almost 20 per cent of total GHG emissions, thus making the scheme even more 
important98.
............................2.1 Allocation of allowances
97 Ellerman.A. D., Pricing Carbon, p. 19-21.
98 Ibid., p.24.
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One of the major criticism of the EU ETS comes from its decentralized nature 
of allocating allowances, as it has the drawback of offering different allocation of 
allowances depending on the state, thus making competition potentially unjust. Unlike 
the US Acid Rain Program for trading S02 permits where allowances were decided on 
a federal level, the EU represents a mixture of procedures and outcomes that depend 
on member states. So far allowances have been granted to C02 emitters for free. 
Emission trading sceptics believe that it means that carbon-intensive industries are 
actually the winners. They are historical emitters, and for what they already emit they 
receive property rights - paying nothing. New entrants who don't have historical 
emissions have to buy credits, which renders them less competitive".
However, in the following analysis of the three phases we shall see why free 
allocation of allowances was chosen and how it has set the ground for the future 
development of the system towards auctioning.
.........................2.2 NAP 1 (2005-7)
The first reduction period lasted from 2005 to 2007. It was not linked to Kyoto 
and it had a number of challenging problems to resolve. First, the data, especially 
from the Eastern European States, was poor and the whole scheme was based on 
very approximate business-as-usual emissions scenario. Second, member states had 
very close deadlines for submitting the data making the process rather patchy and not 
as accurate as wanted. However, in a timely manner the Commission assumed a 
facilitating and educational role that helped regulatory authorities of the member-states 
overcome their inexperience of allowance distribution. Close cooperation with all the 
involved stockholders and the distribution of non-official papers made the preparation 
and the realization of the first period possible100.
........................2.2.1 Allowance volumes and prices
The total allowances proposed by the member states accumulated to 2298.5
99 Ellerman, A. D., Pricing Carbon, 32-85.
100 Ibid., pp.32-85.
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millions of EUAs, yet 2122.16 millions were allowed by the Commission, achieving a 
reduction of 4.3%101.
As for the price of each EUA, the volatility and a zero price at the end of the 
period were actually a predictable result. In the first-period allowances were not 
permitted to be used in the following period and the business-as-usual estimations 
were the core of the calculations. It was not necessary to make cuts as the historical 
emissions were taken as a base and saved emissions could not be banked for the next 
stage -  the two factors that eventually drove the price of the permits to zero by the 
year 2007. The ex-post analysis revealed that this was actually built into the whole 
scheme. The main idea was to introduce an initial cap, distribute the rights and by 
doing so create a market. Once emissions were calculated, the price emerged, giving 
an indication for future regulation.
........................ 2.2.2 Opt-in and opt-out provisions
During the first phase member states could expand the EU ETS scheme to 
sectors that are regulated by the ETS, but are below the defined capacity limits. Only 
Austria, Finland, Latvia, Slovenia and Sweden added combustion installations with 
capacity below 20 MW, accounting for 5 per cent of all installations covered by the 
scheme102.
The first phase also allowed some countries to apply temporary exclusion of 
certain installations if they were subject to emissions constraints. This was supposed 
to help smooth the transition to full trading. Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK 
chose to exclude 570 installation accountable for 38 Mt C02 during the first phase103.
........................2.2.3 Provisions for Auctioning
As mentioned earlier, free allocation of permits is blamed for unambitious 
results. As we have seen, during the first NAP the ambition was actually to have the 
system running, thus the Commission tried to make the conditions less burdensome
101 Ellerman, A. D., Pricing Carbon, pp.32-85.
102 Ibid, pp.32-85.
103 Ibid, pp.32-85.
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possible. Moreover, the idea to auction some of the EUAs never left the negotiations 
table of the Commission. In the first period 5 per cent of the total EUAs volume could 
be auctioned. Yet since the introduction of emission trading had a high political charge 
in the member states, most governments stayed away from auctioning, the only 
exception being Denmark, Hungary, Lithuania and Ireland. Among these countries only 
Denmark used the whole amount foreseen by the Commission. Thus auctioning was 
incorporated into the scheme from the very beginning, only being limited by political 
feasibility104.
........................2.2.4 Kyoto credits
During the first phase installations could use as many CERs as they wanted, 
yet few were actually used due to the higher expected price in the following period as 
well as lack of the accounting link -  the International Transaction Log - between EU 
ETS and CDM registry, that appeared only in 2008105.
............................ 2.3 NAP 2 (2008 -12 )
The second period of emission trading was set to last from 2008-2012. It was a 
follow-up from the first stage but could rely on a number of major improvements made 
during the trial period. First of all, the problem of poor date was resolved. Now that the 
initial emission data was known coupled with robust numbers from trading throughout 
the period, the Commission could plan further reductions in a more informed manner 
and with more ambition. Second, the deadlines were not as pressing as before. The 
system was up and running, allowing for advanced target setting and doable 
deadlines. Third, the price mechanism was set to be completely different: banking 
second period allowances was permitted, excluding the possibility of a zero price at the 
end of the period. Fourth, the scheme got linked to the Kyoto Protocol. Being a cap 
within a cap system, this posed a coordination challenge for the Commission, which 
addressed it by including Jl and CDM projects as additional instruments of offsetting 
carbon emissions. EUAs were tied to AAUs established by the Kyoto Protocol, thus 
bringing all member states in compliance with their obligations under the Kyoto targets. 
What remained the same was the decentralized manner in which member states could
104 Ellerman, A. D., Pricing Carbon, pp.32-85.
105 Ibid., pp.32-85.
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allocate emission perm its106.
........................2.3.1 Allowance volumes and prices
The allowed total of EUAs was established at 2082.68 million, a decrease from 
the NAP1 2122.16 million EUAs, although additional installations were calculated to 
make emissions grow by 2.5 per cent107.
The Linking Directive generated a cost reducing effect. The price of abatement 
projects turned out to be lower than that of EUAs: involving them in the trade could 
make the final price of EUAs slightly less expensive. CER swaps emerged, that 
allowed installations to sell their EUAs and with the obtained money invest in 
JI/CDMs, extracting a margin. Such practices had a limited scope, however. Member 
states had to specify what percentage of NAP's total they wished to have for Jls and 
CDMs. This percentage was calculated as half of the gap between the Kyoto/BSA 
target and either 1990 historical or 2010 projected emissions. In practice this was in a 
range of 7-20 per cent of the NAP 2 total108.
One of the features of the NAP 2 was a requirement for higher reductions from 
the 12 new member states, which initiated charges from Estonia and Poland against 
the Commission for inappropriate assumptions in rejecting NAPs. After reciprocal 
appeals to the Court of First Instance and final European Court of Justice ruling, a NAP 
for Poland was accepted, while Estonia is on it way to having its NAP accepted109.
........................2.3.2 Opt-in provisions
Whereas during the first period only the sectors under the EU ETS were 
allowed to be added to the scheme, the second phase saw member states adding 
sectors that were not covered the ETS. Only the Netherlands chose to participate, 
adding 6 Mt C02 per year. In this way the EU ETS was enlarged by 0.26 per cent, 
which is a small number showing that the opt-in provision did no take up much. Mostly 
it was too costly to monitor smaller installations, and thus it was seen as an
106 Ellerman, A. D., Pricing Carbon, pp.32-85.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
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unnecessary effort that would not yield. No opt-outs were allowed110.
Once the system is established and full auctioning is in place, some 
governments might find it useful to include further installations by using the opt-in 
option, either for fiscal or 'first mover' advantage reasons.
........................2.3.3 Auctioning
As opposed to grandfathering allowances, which was highly supported by 
industries, there was a growing demand for a more transparent and less historically- 
dominated approach to emission distribution. During the second period the 
Commission allowed 10 per cent of the total EUAs volume to be auctioned. This time 
Germany, the UK, The Netherlands and Austria grasped the opportunity, yet the 
maximum used by Germany only accounted for 8.8 per cent. The auctioning failed to 
be used by member states again: in the first period the total of 0.13 per cent was 
auctioned, in the second period -  3 per cent, far below the respective 5 and 10 per 
cent limits. The fact that member states refused to fully implement the auctioning 
option suggests that finding political consensus with industries is a tough challenge, 
making cap-and-trade quite a useful instrument in mitigating regulatory changes111.
........................2.3.4 Kyoto credits
CERs and ERUs are used in accordance with state limits expressed as a 
percentage of the total allocation, accounting for about 13.4 per cent of the EUAs
issued112.
.........................2.4 NAP 1 and NAP 2 results
The first two periods, although the second one is still not finished, by 
preliminary forecasts have fulfilled the task the Commission had envisioned -  allowing 
a decentralized allocation of rights under an established cap with a creation of market 
and price for carbon. The debate about the EU being unambitious about its reduction 
targets and the tools is well grounded and the evidence shows that the measures
110 Ellerman, A. D., Pricing Carbon, pp.32-85.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
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introduced did not have much effect on the GHG reductions. Yet the objective was not 
to exercise cuts from day one, rather, to set the institutions that are capable of yielding 
GHG emissions in a much longer perspective113. The reductions set by the 
Commission for both NAP1 and NAP2 in comparison to proposed caps can be seen in 
graph .
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A number of conclusions were made. First, during the first stages it turned 
impossible to use benchmarking tools for energy efficiency. Poor data, non-
homogeneous nature of products and lack of standards for C02 emissions made it 
difficult to establish an appropriate benchmark. Best available technology (BAT) tools 
were used instead.
Second, it became clear that different sectors of the economy benefit
differently from the scheme. The electric power sector is not subject to non-EU
competition and thus the price for electricity does not compete on the world market.
Electricity producers have proven that they can pass the extra costs to their customers, 
being affected little by the new regulations. On the other hand, many industries have 
their prices set outside the EU on the world market. The new scheme is considered to 
potentially make them lose their market share.
113 Ellerman, A. D., Pricing Carbon, pp.32-85.
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Third, emission permit prices were proved to be volatile, which made investors 
nervous over the choice of future projects.
........................ 2.5 NAP 3
........................2.5.1 The new cap
For the third period the EU established an annual reduction factor of 1.74 per 
cent that will help reach the 21 per cent reduction below 2005 verified emissions by 
2020. While the first NAP was only a rehearsal, it provided the grounds for setting up 
institutions, markets and prices. The second NAP was the first real try after somewhat 
chaotic preparation. It demonstrated the strength of the EU in the area of policy setting 
in yet unknown field of climate change regulation. Having become the centrepiece of 
the Kyoto Protocol scheme, the EU proved its leadership in policy making and 
advanced thinking. The third NAP, yet to be implemented, will see radical changes. 
Distribution of permits will become centralized and taken out of the control of member 
state jurisdictions. Agreed formulas will be used to calculate all the indicators related to 
permit distribution and proceeds from auctions. Aviation sector will fall under carbon 
regulation as well114.
........................2.5.2 Breaking away from NAP1 and NAP2
The provisions for the post-2012 period were introduced by amendments to the 
ETS Directive on 23 January 2008 and approved in December 2008. First and 
foremost, the issue of unequal distribution of benefits from the scheme was addressed. 
Since the major novelty was to introduce auctioning, it was necessary to understand 
how it could affect the three groups of actors: the power sector, the non-power sector, 
and energy intensive sector with significant risks.
The proposal was to allow no free allocation of emission permits to the 
power sector, except for heat delivered to district heating and industrial uses.
The non-power sector was to receive up to 86% of permits for free in
2013, reducing this number by 10 percentage points each year, reaching 2020 with a 
scheme void of any free allocation.
The energy intensive sector with significant risks could receive all of the
114 Ellerman, A. D., Pricing Carbon, pp.32-85.
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allocations for free to counter competitors from other countries who have no C02 
regulation measures in place. Alternatively, the Commission looked at establishing a 
'carbon equalization scheme' or a border tax to protect domestic industries115.
The agreed changes were slightly different from the ones proposed.
The electricity sector could apply for a temporary derogation from 
auctioning with 70 per cent of the average 2005-7 verified emissions distributed freely 
in 2013, phasing it down to zero by 2020 with a possibility of extension.
The non-power market was agreed to be able to delay the phase-out 
scheme till 2027, marking a 30 per cent free allocation baseline in 2020.
The energy intensive sector could have 100 per cent of its permits for
free116.
........................2.5.3 Auctioning revenues
The auctioning revenues use was also addressed by the Commission. At least 
20% of the auctioning revenues that member state governments would receive will 
have to be spent on climate change purposes and reported to the Commission, giving 
states another climate-related obligation. In this way the bulk of the revenues is used 
by the state, keeping the spending of the revenues a national priority117.
........................2.5.4 Kyoto credits
It is expected that project based credits will be used less in the third phase. 
However, installations can carry over the unused second period offsets to the 
subsequent period118.
Apart from confirming the primacy of member states in budgetary issues, the 
new auctioning schemes also gives a response to two other pressing problems -  the 
need for harmonization and a much requested shift from free allocation to a new type 
of incentive setting.
115 Ellerman, A. D., Pricing Carbon, pp.32-85.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
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..2.5.5 Harmonization
During the first two phases it was to member states' discretion how they 
wanted to allocate allowances. Due to political pressure and a concern for 'community- 
wide and fully harmonized implementing measures', during the third phase the EU will 
take care of harmonizing transitional free allocation to industries within sectors. The 
EU will also supervise the new entrant reserve (NER), established at 5 per cent for the 
industrial sector119.
There are concerns whether the centralized approach to the allocation 
practices will have the aspired effect and be executable, yet harmonization is the first 
step towards a more balanced and just way of regulation emissions.
........................2.5.6 'Windfall profits' or newly shaped incentives
Moving from free allocation to auctioning is viewed by some as an opportunity 
for member states to get 'windfall profits' from selling permits. While mostly true, 
auctioning provides equal grounds for all the participants, eliminates the profits from 
holding permits for historical emissions and makes agents take into account the cost of 
carbon during their decision making process. Having an auction can also mean having 
a more tax-like scheme for participants, which was initially preferred by the EU120.
........................ 2.6 Including the Aviation sector
The biggest change starting from 2012 will be to include aviation into the EU 
ETS. All airlines flying in and out of the EU will be constrained by the Aviation Trading 
Scheme (ATS), expanding the scheme by 15 per cent. The aviation sector will be able 
to buy allowances from the ETS, but it will not be able to sell aviation allowances 
(AAs), though. The cap will be 3 per cent below the average emissions in 2004-2006, 
and 5 per cent below the same average for 2015. This new legislation will mean that 
non-EU airlines will have to pay a sort of a border tax, giving the EU leadership role in 
setting up new rules for C02 emissions across the world.
119 Ellerman, A. D., Pricing Carbon, pp.32-85.
120 Convery, E, 'Origins and Development of the EU ETS’, Environmental and Resource Economics 43 
(3), 2009, pp.391-412.
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The EU decided against including road transport into the scheme as many 
countries already have fuel taxation regimes and receive important fiscal income from 
it. Moreover, car manufacturing lobby, especially form Germany, turned out to be 
stronger than the aviation one. The same scheme as for aviation is probably awaiting 
the maritime sector.
By 2012 the EU ETS will be expanded by 22 per cent, mostly due to the 
inclusion of the aviation sector, but also due opt-in installations and non EU member 
states -  Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland -  joining in. Also, in comparison to 2005 
there are two new member states that have joined the EU ETS -  Romania and 
Bulgaria. Graph 5 illustrates the expected growth of the carbon market by 2012.
.............. 2.8 Kyoto Link
The EU ETS system is connected to the Kyoto Protocol by a Linking Directive,
2.7 EU ETS expansion
Graph 9: Expansion of EU ETS coverage (Carbon Finance 2009)
Source.EHerman, Pricing Carbon, p.270.
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that allows EU installations use offset credits generated by Clean Development 
Mechanism and Joint Implementation program, discussed in the previous chapter121.
3 Results o f the EU ETS
Despite all the achievements, there is strong criticism against the chosen 
model. As argued by the Yale professor William D. Nordhaus, quantity-type systems 
with international trading tend to present more opportunities for corruption. Domestic 
governments have an incentive to collude with polluters in order to underestimate 
domestic emissions and hide from international monitors. The results of the third EU 
ETS phase are hoped to correct the potential for collusion through the harmonized 
nature of emission permit distribution122.
Nordhaus also believes that the CDM element that became part of the EU ETS 
has been the major source of 'accounting emissions' with questionable additionality. 
The EU-ETS had little internal emissions reductions -  130 million tons, compared to 
280 million tons obtained in the form of offsets offered by the Clean Development 
Mechanism. He compares the CDM to credit default swaps, a notoriously defective 
financial instrument123.
EU ETS produced a volatile price for carbon that makes industries unwilling to 
participate in low-carbon projects due to uncertainty of future carbon price. This has 
undermined the effort of the EU to step into a low-carbon future as for now the 
introduced incentives are not doing their job.
The free allocation of allowance under the EU ETS has also generated 
'windfall profits' for those sectors -  especially electricity - that have been able to pass 
on the price of carbon allowances to their customers. This has made customers worse 
off with little effect on climate change.
121 Ellerman, A. D., Pricing Carbon, pp.260-287.
122 Nordhaus,W.D., 'Economic Perspectives on Climate Change1 (Lecture for the Yale Climate Institute, 
Yale University, 15.01, 2010) <http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/>.
123 Ibid.
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Despite all setbacks, the idea of creating a constrained access to a resource 
that once used to be free has been proven doable by the EU. It did previously happen 
with other non-regulated sectors such as fisheries, yet carbon is much bigger and 
diverse 'product', making the EU experience a ground-breaking one. Being the first one 
to attempt such regulation, the EU has acquired a moral and know-how lead on the 
international level. In order to achieve bigger efficiencies the EU has already proposed 
to introduce auctioning in the third phase, moving the system from 2013 towards a 
more tax-like one. The EU ETS, despite much criticism and demands for a tax based 
system that was considered in the Commission in the 1990s but was rejected by 
member states, is, therefore, a system to stay. Further improvement to make it work 
are possible: for instance, by introducing a complementary floor tax on carbon or 
creating a window of volatility. These will be discussed in the next chapter.
In this chapter we carefully looked at the setup o f the EU ETS scheme and 
discussed the major phases of it, including its link with the Kyoto. We have seen the 
shift from free allocations to auctioning and looked at both praise and criticism of the 
system. This will let us move forward towards the issue we declared the core of our 
research -  creating a hybrid system combining both cap-and-trade ans tax so as to 
stimulate competitiveness of the EU carbon regulated industries.
62
Chapter 5. Hybrid model
In this chapter we shall critically look at the EU ETS and discuss its failures. 
Then we shall look at how these failures can be avoided by introducing taxation 
element to the system. Floor and ceiling prices meant to curb emission permit price 
volatility will be discussed, as well as their potential influence on the system. The 
chapter will conclude with the summary o f methods available and their probability of 
being implemented.
EU ETS has become a reality, and will continue to regulate carbon trading till 
at least 2020, when the third phase of trading is supposed to finish. Previously we 
discussed two alternative ways of addressing climate change: cap-and-trade and 
carbon taxation. We have looked at the two schemes conceptually and discussed the 
running of the EU ETS. We saw that the only alternative to cap-and-trade system -  the 
taxation model -  is very difficult to achieve politically despite all its benefits and 
scientific support. It leaves us with the conclusion that the most probable scenario for 
the EU is to make improvements to the existing EU ETS model. The goal of the 
Commission will be to make the system work, making permits an efficient instrument of 
climate change regulation. In this chapter we shall look more closely at why cap-and- 
trade system should be modified and how the necessary changes can be achieved.
1 Reasons for a change
The reality of the EU ETS has been proven to be driven by special interests 
and industry giveaways, achieving results that are less than what could have been 
expected124. This makes policymakers think of how further incentives can be 
introduced in order to correct the failures of the system.
Price volatility of the EU ETS is a big concern. We have already discussed this 
issue when talking about the EU ETS in detail in chapter four. As seen from graph 10,
124 Gardiner, B., 'Lack of Direction', (para. 14 of 24).
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the price of carbon has seen drastic changes over the life of the EU ETS. During the 
first period, from 2005 to 2007, it saw a big drop in April 2006 when it was announced 
that actual emissions were lower than expected. Coupled with no possibility to bank 
allowances, it drove the price to zero by the end of the 2007. As we already know the 
provisions of the first period were different from what was followed afterwards, as the 
first NAP was only a trial, thus it would be unwise to extrapolate the characteristics of 
the first phase on the consequent ones. We can see that in 2008, when the second 
phase started, the price ranged between €12 to €25/tonne. The crisis further brought 
the price down to €8 a tonne in February 2009. Ever since then the price stabilized at 
around €14, reaching €15 in April 2010 as firms started to buy permits to meet their 
end of year obligations and to secure a lower price for allowance banking due to 
foreseen cut in cap by 3 per cent in June 2010.
18 0TC Volume (spot) ■  Exchange Volume (forward) (1 Exchange Volume (spot)
8  0TC Volume (forward) Dec 2008 —  Dec 2010
—  Dec 2007
Graph 10: The line charts show the development o f  Point Carbon's bid-offer closing price fo r  EU allowances 
(EUA 2005, EUA 2006, EUA 2007, EUA 2008 and EUA 2009)
http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/cme/
........................ 1.1 Reasons for volatility
The observed volatility is what troubles the market players. The crises-related
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volatility reflects a drop in the energy production and does not tell much about the way 
carbon market behaves. What makes price volatile -  given the fact that continuous cap 
cuts are part of the system -  is how quickly businesses can adjust to new demands 
and reduce their emissions. Thus volatility, in some part, indicates the demand for 
carbon and the EU economy's response to the new carbon constraints. Some market 
participants attribute volatility to the uncertainty related to political decisions in the EU. 
Very often the market reacts to comments from officials in the Commission or member 
states. For instance, when in May 2010 Connie Hedegaard, the European commission 
climate chief, said it was possible for the carbon price to reach €30, the prices grew 
almost immediately. Events outside the EU influence the price as well. Foreseen 
introduction of a cap-and-trade in the US announced by Kerry-Lieberman 'American 
Power Act' and possible emission trading schemes in Australia and Japan in the future 
will have an effect on the EU allowances price as this would mean market expansion. 
Hence there are many factors that make prices fluctuate, volatility being the major 
concern of the whole EU ETS125.
Another observation regarding volatility of the price comes from the fact, that 
the Commission establishes a cap, and thus the total amount of emissions does not 
change. What changes is the way businesses adapt to reduced emission targets and 
hence the price. It would be erroneous to expect a quick and drastic change in 
technology in the short-term, thus a major drop in price can occur only if the cap is not 
tight enough. Due to political uncertainty around the future of the world carbon trading 
as a result of the inconclusive negotiations during the Copenhagen Summit, the EU 
might continue with the special treatment practice for certain industries, making cap- 
and-trade requirements less stringent. The way incentives are given by the EU will 
continue to make carbon prices volatile. This in turn will affect the way businesses 
behave and whether they will deliver the expected C02 reduction.
.........................1.2 Importance of stable prices
At stake is the future efficiency of the EU economy. Stable prices give
125 McGarrity, J., 'Caution Urged on Carbon Price Floors', Point Carbon, 13.05, 2010 
<http://www.pointcarbon.eom/news/1.1444086> [accessed 13 May 2010].
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confidence to investors about which projects to choose. Given an expectation of 
certain price, investors can opt for advanced technologies increasing efficiencies and 
emitting less C02. However, if prices are volatile investors have less incentive to go for 
costly and thus riskier projects that promise greater reductions. Instead, it might be 
more cost effective for them to pay for extra amount of C02 emitted or to shift the 
production abroad, where there is no future risk related to carbon emissions.
To give an example of how carbon price affects business choices we can look 
at coal, the dirtiest energy source of today. It has been estimated that in order to use 
less coal and switch to gas or other alternative fuels, the price of carbon has to go up 
from the current €15 to €25 or even €60, as believed by some industry experts, to 
make it possible126. How can industries be sure that carbon doesn't become 
prohibitively cheap? Clearly, something has to be changed in the way the system 
operates. In the next section we shall see how a tax mechanism can be introduced at 
the EU level to complement the cap-and-trade.
2 Mixing carbon taxation with existing EU ETS
There are a number of ways in which the current trading scheme can be 
improved. First, some sort of regulation can be imposed on sectors that are currently 
not under the EU ETS, thus complementing the scheme by expanding coverage to the 
rest of the economy. Second, the issue of volatility can be addressed by limiting it in a 
number of ways: governments may trade permits so as to keep prices withing the 
volatility window, or taxes can be added to the existing cap-and-trade scheme so as to 
set the floor for the carbon price.
As we have seen, the third period will bring the aviation sector under the cap, 
which will make the system more fare by expanding it beyond the current 45 per cent 
of European carbon coverage. However, expansion does not necessarily improve 
volatility, as the current sector under the EU ETS is broad enough to make the 
conclusion that the price has to be stabilized in some way. Next we shall look at how 
the price can be limited via an introduction of a tax.
126 McGarrity, J., 'Caution Urged on Carbon Price Floors'.
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2.1 Non-EU ETS regulating tax
Before we proceed to the discussion of a tax within the EU ETS, it is viewed 
important to see how carbon taxes work in general. For that we shall consider the 
developments in the non-EU ETS sector for examples.
........................2.1.1 Environmental tax in the EU countries
During the 1990s a number of EU countries introduced environmental taxes in 
order to regulate energy consumption and C02 emissions, while at the same time 
cutting income taxes and social security contributions and in that way producing a 
revenue neutral tax shift. Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK 
were the first to introduce such taxes127.
The taxes included duties on energy products such as oil, coal, and electricity 
consumption, as well as C02. The taxes targeted both households and industries, 
providing favorable conditions or giving exemptions to the former or to the latter 
depending on the country. The objective was twofold: environmental support as well as 
employment benefits through lowering the cost of labor. As a result an impulse to more 
efficiency and less consumption was given, lowering labor costs128.
As the initial idea of the Commission was to install a taxation system rather 
than cap-and-trade in order to regulate climate change, there are existing provisions 
for taxation in the current legislation. The Energy Tax Directive, which was enacted in 
2003, among other requirements sets minimum rates of duty on motor fuels, heating 
oils and electricity129.
The rates set by the Energy Tax Directive are very low and new EU member 
states received reduced rates and various exemptions. It is largely in the discretion of 
member states whether to introduce a higher than minimum energy tax or not. France
127Speck, S.;Jilkova,J. 'Design of Environmental Tax Reform in Europe' in Carbon Energy Taxation 
Lessons from Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009, pp. 24-54.
128 Ibid, pp.24-54.
129'EU Carbon Tax on New Commission's Agenda Early Next Year', Euractive, 04.11,2009 
<http://www.euractiv.com/en/climate-change/eu-carbon-tax-new-commission-agenda-early- 
year/article-187029> [accessed 13 May 2010] (para. 2 of16).
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has considered introducing a tax aimed at the sectors outside the EU ETS, but in 
march 2010 the Conseil d'Etat ruled such tax to be unconstitutional, as it exempted 93 
per cent of industrial emissions from it130.
Unlike the environmental legislation of the 1990s implemented in some of the 
member states, the Directive does not include provisions for taxing carbon, as this idea 
was unpopular and the cap-and-trade system was going to be established. Thus, the 
Energy Tax Directive covers the non-EU ETS sectors such as transportation and 
households. However, Energy Tax Directive received criticism as it is believed that it 
creates double regulation of the industry: indeed, once electricity producers have been 
able to shift their emission permits expenses on users, the latter have to pay both for 
the EU ETS induced increase in price and the additional tax on electricity use131.
Regulating the non-EU ETS sectors is a valid contribution to the climate 
change legislation agenda, and it has the potential to stimulate more efficiency and 
less consumption where implemented. Next we shall, however, concentrate exclusively 
on the sectors under the EU ETS to try to address the volatility problem.
.........................2.2 Volatility curbing tax to complement the EU ETS
The core idea of curbing volatility is to set limits on how low or how high the 
price can go. Creating such window of volatility is believed to guarantee a minimum 
and a maximum price of carbon and encourage investors to take up low carbon 
projects.
There are two ways of setting the volatility window. The first is for the 
government to guarantee a minimum price and buy any permits offered for sale at this 
price, as well as guaranteeing a maximum price, at which the government would sell 
an unlimited number of permits or allow the participants to pay a penalty for any
130 Hall, B., 'Paris Scraps Carbon Tax Plan1, FT (Paris) 23.04, 2010 
<http://www.ft.eom/cms/s/0/1b000010-3686-11df-8151-00144feabdc0.html)> [accessed 13 May 
2010] (para. 12of15).
131 Speck, S., Design of Environmental Tax Reform in Europe', pp. 24-54.
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emission for which they had no allowances132. American Power Act falls under this 
policy option, as it suggests introducing a price window -  from $12 to 25133. If the price 
is limited from both ends, including floor and ceiling as it is suggested in the Kerry 
Lieberman bill, it may dissuade financial institutions from trading carbon.
The second way to achieve less volatility is to introduce a carbon tax that 
would establish a floor price. It means breaking what used to be the price of a permit 
into two parts: carbon tax plus the price of a permit. Naturally, this will reduce the price 
of a permit, as now it is only a fraction of what it used to be, whereas the total paid for 
a unit of emissions remains the same. The tax is fixed, meaning that in any 
circumstances emitters would pay some minimum price. The variable -  the permit 
price -  will still be volatile and depend on efficiencies reached by the carbon market, 
but the total price for emissions will be a lot less volatile as a result. Providing a stable 
floor price for carbon would introduce more predictability into the market, providing low- 
carbon investors with the knowledge of the minimal price134. This approach is seen as 
the optimal one as investors, especially utilities, would support it, because they will 
know that there is a minimum they can expect and the maximum can be as high as the 
market allows. For example, EDF, who is planing to build nuclear plants in the UK, has 
already welcomed the decision made by the UK coalition government to introduce a 
floor levy.
The tax could be set to change gradually over time, giving the investors an 
instrument of calculating the minimum expected price of carbon in the future. It also 
gives the collecting authority a steady income, unlike auctioning that can not produce 
any predictable revenue.
As argued by Paul Ekins, such carbon tax would work only if it is introduced at 
an EU level or in a significant number of countries to have an impact on the whole EU. 
Otherwise it might have a negative effect on the industries as they might receive a 
stimulus to look for carbon leakage opportunities. The issue of introducing a 
complementary floor tax is thus a political one. Taxation is viewed as a strictly domestic
132 Ekins,P., 'Carbon Taxes and Emissions Trading:lssues and Interactions' in Carbon-Energy Taxation.
Lessons from Europe,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 258.
133 McGarrity, J., 'Caution Urged on Carbon Price Floors'.
134 Ekins,P.,'Carbon Taxes and Emissions', p. 258.
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matter, thus governments oppose to the introduction of a EU-wide tax in fear of seeing 
EU gradually steal certain functions from member states135.
The UK has been the major opponent to the introduction of any EU tax; the 
newly elected coalition government of conservatives and liberal democrats have 
announced, however, that they are determined to set a floor price for EU allowances 
for electricity producers in the UK. If Germany, the biggest EU emitter, agrees to a floor 
price, it might positively affect the situation around the introduction of a carbon tax on 
the European level. The unanimity of member states is required for a decision on 
taxation matters -  if that happens, a floor price for carbon may become a European 
reality, requiring a levy from carbon-intensive industries if the price falls below some 
chosen level136.
To avoid double regulation, the 2007 Green Paper that proposes a revision of 
the Energy Tax Directive suggests to split the tax into energy and carbon components, 
making the EU ETS sectors exempt from the carbon component, while still keeping the 
energy one. This can set a minimum price on energy for all sectors, lowering volatility 
of the permit prices137.
Yet even if there is a unanimous agreement on this proposal, it is unlikely that 
the minimum price will be high enough. The Commission estimates that €39 per tonne 
of C02, more than twice of the today's price, is the necessary price if EU is to achieve 
its 2020 reduction target138.
Given the peculiarities of the system already on place, introducing a floor tax 
and creating a hybrid model for carbon regulation would be a viable way to reduce 
volatility and provide a stable price for investors to have as a reference point.
3 Potential complications
If the cap-and-trade system is to take up across the world, and if volatility
135 Ekins,P.,'Carbon Taxes and Emissions', p. 258.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
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window in some of its form is introduced, there can be potential clashes between 
systems. Different approaches to carbon tax in the EU and in the US may lead to 
making carbon trade between these countries difficult. If the US decides to have a 
ceiling price amidst a higher than ceiling price for carbon expected in the EU, the 
prices will go up in the US as well, making the upper limit lose sense. If no linking 
between the two markets is provided it might hamper the international carbon market. 
All of this is yet to be determined, and as of now introducing a floor tax is a promising 
and probable option.
Introducing a hybrid model has the potential of curbing volatility, providing 
stable income to the governments, and giving investors a clear indication of the 
minimum carbon price while creating a level playing field for new technologies139.
In this chapter we looked at how a hybrid model that adds a taxation element 
to the EU ETS can work for the cap-and-trade scheme. We discussed the options 
considered both in the US and in the EU and how they may potentially interact. We 
concluded by saying that having a floor price on carbon will be beneficial for the EU as 
it will bring stable income to the governments as well as predictability to investors. In 
the next chapter we shall complement our discussion by looking at the competition that 
EU industries may face due to a tightened cap and a hybrid model, as well as the 
effect such developments can have on climate change.
139 McGarrity, J., 'Caution Urged on Carbon Price Floors'.
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Chapter 6. EU competitiveness and carbon 
leakage
In this chapter we shall look at the major challenges that the EU ETS puts 
forward for EU industries. We shall see that relationship with the developing world and 
the choice o f technologies have the biggest effect on the success of the EU emission 
trading scheme. Major attention will be given to carbon leakage and nuclear energy 
production. The chapter will conclude with some suggestions about how the EU can 
attain its low-carbon goals by cooperating with the developing world.
1 EU leadership in cutting carbon
The EU ETS has changed the way energy is consumed withing the union. 
Although the price of permit, now being approximately €15, is still lower than € 30, the 
price most researchers claim necessary in order to attain required GHG emission cuts, 
it has brought significant changes: the EU market is reaching maturity, carbon 
emissions and carbon offsets are regularly traded and affect the way businesses make 
their plans140. Having established the world's largest carbon market that trades EUAs 
and having widely used international carbon instruments such as CERs and EURs, the 
EU has set the price for the world carbon. The EU ETS signals the price of carbon to 
the rest of the world, leading to the development of offset projects in the countries and 
sectors not included into the EU ETS, mobilizing the rest of the world to participate in 
carbon trading.
The possibility for other countries to get linked to the EU ETS, as it has been 
done by Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland, allows for possible further linkage from the 
US, Japan, Australia and Canada, setting a platform for a truly global carbon trading. 
The US and Japan are on their way to setting caps. The Kerry-Lieberman bill is 
seeking to introduce a cap-and-trade scheme in 2013 and to cut US GHG emissions 
17 per cent below 2005 levels by 2020141. Japan, one of the world's biggest economies
140 McGarrity, J., 'Caution Urged on Carbon Price Floors'.
141 Carroll, R., 'Analysis Sees Strong Consumer Protection in Climate Bill', Point Carbon (London)
14.05, 2010 <http://www.pointcarbon.eom/news/1.1444315> [accessed 14 May 2010],
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and a major polluter has announced its determination to set absolute volume caps on 
emissions, yet the date is not clear yet142. These developments will definitely affect the 
carbon market, yet for now the EU is the only one that has introduced a carbon price. 
This can mean some competitiveness challenges as the firms within the EU have to 
compete with the firms that bare zero carbon restrictions, which may lead to carbon 
leakage.
2 Major challenges
The major challenges that lie in front of the EU are varied. We shall 
concentrate on what we believe to be the most pressing ones: the risks emanating 
from the developing world and the technological response options currently considered 
by the EU.
.........................2.1 Developing world
The major challenges come from the developing world and are threefold: first, 
developing world nations are the ones that are likely to be worse off from climate 
change; second, they are the biggest consumers of the future; third, they do not have 
carbon regulation in place, making way for carbon leakage from the developed world. 
In the following sections we shall look at these issues in more detail.
........................2.1.1 Climate change effects on the developing world
As argued by Stern, the impacts of climate change are not evenly distributed
— the poorest countries and people will suffer earliest and most. The developing world 
will be unable to continue with its poverty reduction policies, getting mired in health, 
education and wealth gaps. Developing countries are at a geographical disadvantage, 
being already warmer and suffering from rainfall variability, meaning that the 
temperatures will continue rising and available water will become even more scarce. 
Being dependent on agriculture, the most climate-sensitive sector, there will be fewer
142 Masaki, H., 'Japanese Parliamentary Panel Passes Climate Bill', Point Carbon (Tokyo) 14.05, 2010 
<http://www.pointcarbon.eom/news/1.1444250> [accessed 14 May 2010].
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revenues to keep up with health provision and to improve public services. Investment 
opportunities will be small, leading to more deaths, increased over the border migration 
and violent conflicts over land143.
The first challenge related to the developing world is, thus, their susceptibility 
to major suffering from climate change, which will require international effort to 
resolve.
........................2.1.2 Carbon emitters of the future
Another important observation is that fossil fuels, which account for 87 per cent 
of world energy consumption and responsible for almost all current C02 emissions, 
remain the fuel of choice due to their abundance as a result of improved efficiency. The 
largest energy consumers are the US, China, Russia, Japan, India, Canada, Germany, 
France, South Korea and Brazil, among which are the largest consumers of tomorrow
-  the developing countries. It has been demonstrated that GDP growth and energy use 
are highly correlated, meaning that India and China are the biggest polluters of the 
future144. During the UN climate summit in Copenhagen it became evident that the 
whole multinational debate narrowed down to the commitments the US and China 
could agree on145. Whereas the Kerry-Lieberman bill is establishing a cap-and-trade 
system in 2013, Chinese government is far from any major action to reduce carbon. 
The Chinese government has enacted administrative measures to achieve energy 
efficiency goals, but the incentive to lower energy consumption by 20 per cent per a 
unit of GDP by 2010 has not included a total cap on emissions, making China the 
biggest emitter of green house gases, leaving behind even the US. As the country is 
still in the process of urbanization and industrialization, GHG are bound to grow146.
The discussed gap between developed and developing world brings us to the 
definition of the second risk -  increasing emission from developing countries, that will
143 Stern. N.. 'The Stern Review'.
144 Griffin, J.M., A Smart Energy Policy, p.60.
145 Vidal, J.;Stratton, A.; Goldenberg, S., 'LowTargets, Goals Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in Failure', 
The Guardian (London) 19.12, 2009
<http://www.guardian.co.Uk/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-dealRetrieved> [accessed 22 
April 2010] (para. 2 of 18).
146 Pan, J., 'Addressing Climate Change Through Sustainable Development1 in Climate Change 
Perspectives, eJournal USA, 2009, <http://www.america.gov/publications/ejournalusa.html>.
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continue to grow and thus continue to require more energy, with a high probability of 
choosing wealth over climate concerns.
........................2.1.3 Carbon leakage
Once EU the regulation becomes more stringent, businesses will have to look 
for opportunities to cut costs even further. Most of the world's production is already 
placed outside the EU and this process might accelerate. Since there is no system of 
carbon control in place in the developing world, European businesses might be 
inclined to relocate where possible.
Indeed, the EU has taken a unilateral action to curb its carbon emissions. The 
effectiveness of such a policy is measured by carbon leakage, expressed as the 
increase in C02 outside the area with carbon regulation in place divided by the 
reduction in the emissions within the regulated area. There are concerns that having 
emission reduction targets in one region might not be effective, as carbon-intensive 
production will move outside147.
Graph 11: Evidence for carbon leakage in exports and imports in the UK and Germany. 
Note(s): % difference represents the difference between the Baseline case and the Reference case. 
Source(s): Cambridge Econometrics.
www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol Energy Policy 35 (2007) 6281—6292
There have been concerns regarding carbon leakage with the EU. Based on 
the Cambridge Econmetrics' E3 model for Europe, Terry Barker et al. looked at carbon
147 Barker, T.; Junankar, S.; Pollitt, H.; Summerton, P. 'Carbon Leakage from Unilateral Environmental 
Tax Reforms in Europe, 1995-2005' in Carbon-Energy Taxation. Lessons from Europe, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2009, pp.215-236.
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leakage within the EU in 1995-2005, comparing countries with existing environmental 
tax reform (ETS) -  Denmark, Germany, Finland, The Netherlands, Sweden and the UK
- and those those that did not have any carbon regulation. The study concluded that in 
the non-regulated countries carbon leakage is very small, being negative in some 
years. This is shown in graph 11, composed by the authors of the study148.
Another finding of this research is that emissions fall when there is some form 
of carbon regulation, yet that does not have any effect on other countries in the EU. 
This is shown in graph 12, where environmental tax reform countries reduce their 
emissions by 3-4 per cent, while non-ETR countries have the same level of emissions 
as before. The authors conclude that environmental tax reform in six EU countries from 
1995 to 2005 suggests that there is no carbon leakage going on, output not being 
relocated away from carbon regulated countries. It is believed that this is due to the 
fact the taxes were very small and could not have a considerable impact to justify the 
relocation149.
Gr­
aph 12: Changes in CO emissions in ETR and non-ETR regions. Note(s):% difference represents the 
difference between the Baseline case and the Reference case. Source(s): Cambridge Econometrics. 
www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol Energy Policy 35 (2007) 6281-6292
However, carbon leakage or its absence withing the EU does not tell much 
about carbon leakage outside the union. European industrial associations for a long 
time have been talking about the risk of de-industrialisation in Europe and moving 
production elsewhere if the EU is to continue with its carbon policy. The industries that
148 Barker, T., 'Carbon Leakage from Unilateral Environmental Tax Reforms’, pp.215-236.
149 Ibid., pp.215-236.
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are believed to suffer the most are those that consume the most energy: alloys, 
cement, ceramics, chloralkali, glass, iron and steel, lime, non-ferrous metals and paper 
industries. They are the once that may want to seek arbitrage opportunities outside the 
EU150.
The EU has responded by coming up with a list of exemptions offered to the 10 
per cent of the most efficient factories in accordance with a performance benchmark. 
Some studies, such as those conducted by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) conclude that 
such fears are overstated. According to the calculations of Claude Turmes, a Green 
member of the European Parliament, the exposure of the EU industries to non-EU 
competition is less than 2 per cent for the EU's lime and cement industry, around 5 per 
cent for EU refineries, and less than 20 per cent for the steel sector151.
However, it is also argued that carbon leakage is a matter of time, and more of 
it will be occurring in the future as the cap-and-trade system develops. 
Eurogypsum President Jean-Pierre Clavel suggests that geographic proximity is a 
good opportunity for the EU industries. Moving factories to neighboring countries such 
as Ukraine, which, for example, is close to the gypsum source in Poland, is viable152.
Russian gas supplies offers an interesting insight. Russia provides the EU with 
more than 40 per cent of its gas imports153, and plans to provide China, which is 
moving its economy from coal to gas-based one, with gas starting from 2015154. As in 
2010 the production of gas was scheduled to be 643 billion cubic meters and exports 
were estimated to be 168 billion, adding China alone would mean sourcing out 
approximately another 68 billion cubic meters of gas annually in exports155. Despite
150 “EU Industry and The 'Carbon Leakage' Threat”, Euroactive, 27.01, 2009, updated 09.03, 2010 
<http://www.euractiv.com/en/climate-change/carbon-leakage-challenge-eu-industry/article-176591> 
[accessed 16 May 2010].
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 Boulden, J.; Miller, A.; Warrington Taylor, P.;Boltman. T.; Sefanov, M., 'Gas Row Flares as Supplies 
to Europe Cut', CNN (London) 06.01, 2009
<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/01/06/ukraine.russia.gas/index.html> [accessed 14 
May 2010],
154 Topalov, A., «ra3npoM» Toponmcfl b Kmaii (Gazprom Is Rushing to China), Gazeta (Moscow) 
29.03, 2010 <http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2010/03/29/3344507.shtml> [accessed 14 May 2010],
155 'Poccvw BflBoe yBennMnna SKcnopT ra3a' (Russia Has Doubled Gas Exports), Novaya Politika 
(Moscow) 04.05, 2010, <http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/credit statistics/print.asp?file=aas.htm>
77
continuing exploration projects, Russia might have difficulties meeting both its growing 
domestic and foreign demands for gas. As energy efficiency remains low and has little 
prospects of being corrected in the near future, Russia will have to cover its domestic 
consumption by employing other energy sources as it depends on its long-term foreign 
gas exports contracts for revenues. Russia has already started to further develop coal- 
based electricity production156, thus increasing its carbon emissions into the 
atmosphere. As demand for gas will grow, it is quite possible that Russia's reliance of 
coal for domestic needs will continue157.
We can conclude that carbon leakage is a very probable scenario related to 
the development of the EU ETS that has to be considered as a major risk.
By looking at the three major challenges in the context of the EU vs. 
developing world countries we see that EU ETS with its current volatile prices is facing:
- increased demand for help from the poorest countries to alleviate climate 
change related problems of deteriorated health, development and wealth,
- continued climate change across the world due to increasing energy 
consumption in the developing world,
- carbon leakage from within the EU to the developing world, thus minimizing 
the positive effect from the carbon legislation.
This puts the issue of developing world on the EU agenda, as the EU ETS is 
linked to it in a numerous ways, as we have just seen.
........................2.2 Technological response
By passing the EU directive on renewable energies, the block agreed in 2008 
to a binding target of increasing the share of renewable energy to 20 per cent by 2020. 
Today the share of renewables is 8.5 per cent, thus the challenge is quite 
demanding158.
[accessed 15 May 2010],
156Trifonov, E., Topofl-aA'CHell City), Gazeta (Moscow) 26.03, 2010
<http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2010/03/26_a_3343366.shtml> [accessed 15 May 2010].
157 Ibid.
158 'EU Renewable Energy Policy', Euroactive, 02.08, 2007, updated 15.02, 2010
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As the remaining 80 per cent of energy is still to be covered by conventional 
means, there is a strong move for nuclear energy in the EU, with many countries 
proposing to build new reactors159. Today nuclear power provides 15 per cent of the EU 
energy consumption with 163 nuclear installations around the EU160, posing the 
question of where to keep radioactive waste161. Some considerations on nuclear 
energy are presented in the box.
We can conclude that the major challenges facing the EU today emanate from 
its relationship with the developing world and from its choice of technology for energy 
production. Developing world will require more help due to negative effects of global 
warming. It will also continue emitting more C02 as its major economies grow. 
Developing countries are likely to become hosts to carbon leakage resulting from EU 
firms relocating its production in fear of losing competitiveness. The choice of 
technology for energy generation will also continue to be a major challenge as 
choosing certain types of energy sources may have a adverse effect on climate 
change despite the effort made by the EU.
<http://www.euractiv.com/en/eneray/eu-renewable-enerav-Dolicv/article-117536> [accessed 16 May 
2010],
159 'Non-renewables, Reactors Under Construction/Planned/Proposed1, 01.07, 2009 
<http://www.energy.eu/#depletion> [accessed 16 May 2010].
160 'Nuclear power plants in Europe, European Nuclear Society1, 21.03, 2010 
<http://www.euronuclear.org/info/maps.htm>[accessed 15 May 2010],
161 'Nuclear Waste Storage' <http://www.energy.eu/focus/NuclearWasteStorage.php> [accessed 16 May 
2010],
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Nuclear Energy
Many steps of the nuclear cycle have been proved dangerous. Birth defects, leukemia and 
cancer noticed in Niger, the world's fourth poorest country, are claimed to be linked to the uranium 
mining by French giant AREVA, which gets half of its uranium from this country. Revived interest in 
nuclear power in the EU due to the climate change issue has spurred the company to develop its third 
mine in 2013-2014, jeopardizing the lives of the country's population, unaware of the dangers 
associated with uranium mining.
Disposing of radioactive waste poses a similar threat to the populations who live in the 
areas where it us stored. Since 1993 Russia has been importing uranium hexafluoride for enrichment 
and storage. German company Urenco, owned by the UK and Dutch governments as well as by E.On 
and RWE AG, was shipping radioactive waste to Russia from 1996 to 2009 from a factory in Gronau. 
The total amount of waste is estimated to be 100 thousand tonnes French company AREVA is still 
exporting its nuclear waste into the country, contributing to about 125 thousand tonnes of uranium 
hexafluoride already stored. There is evidence that the waste is not properly protected and very often 
neglected, breaking security standards. Russia has announced that from 2010 it will stop importing 
uranium hexafluoride from EU countries, yet the tonnes already kept in the Russian sole are to 
remain their indefinitely.
Technological change that is required by the EU ETS, as we have seen, may have adverse 
effects on the populations and ecology of other nations. The good-intended incentives have the 
potential of turning into environmental collapse in the future.
Sources:
1. 'AREVA’S Dirty Little Secret', Greenpeace, 06.05, 2010 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/newsffeatures/AREVAS-dirty-little-secrets060510/> [accessed 15 
May 2010],
2. Urenco, <http://www.urenco.eom/Content/3/lnvestors.aspx>.
3 . Veksler, J.; Chizhova, L., 'Poccmh npoflon>KaeT BB03MTb paflM oam iB H bie  o txoam ' (Russia Continues to Import 
Radioactive Waste) 30.05,2007 <http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/arlicle/395144.html> [accessed 15 May 
2010],
4 . ’H c to p ms B B 03a orw  b Poccwo' (The History of Importing Uranium Hexafluoride in Russia), Greenpeace, 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/russia/ru/1304563/1317323>
5 . 'PocaTOM He 6yfleT npoA/ieBaTb n nepe3aKnKxaTb KompaKTbi Ha f lo o 6 orameHi/ie o r o y  m3 EBponbi' (Rosatom 
Will Not Prolong or Sign Contracts for Enrichment of Uranuim Hexafluoride from Europe), Rosatom, 23.11,09 
<httn7/www rnsatnm ru/rii/ahnut/nrfiss centre/news m ain/indfix.nhn’?id4=14R17> rar.r.fissfid 16 M a v? 01 0 l
3 Available responses to challenges
Responding to the identified challenges is not an easy matter. One of the 
possible responses can be introducing a carbon import tax, that will reflect the price of
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carbon in the price of imported goods. In this way the EU can level the playing field for 
all the producers, no matter whether they act under carbon regulation scheme or not. 
This approach has its critics and proponents. Critics believe that introducing an import 
tax is difficult due to a varied nature of products imported, also they believe that this 
could damage the free trade due to its protectionist nature. The proponents, on the 
other hand, point out to the fact that WTO has indicated that levying such a tax would 
not contradict the free trade rules162. The issue of introducing such a tax is out of the 
scope of this work, thus we shall concentrate on what we have discussed intensively in 
the previous chapters -  introducing a hybrid model, that would help to resolve the 
problem of carbon price volatility and thus create a clear indication for investors in 
renewable projects. Once the EU industries are more or less aware of the carbon cost, 
they can rely less on plans of carbon relocation and more on green investment. 
Member states would receive stable income from floor taxes, being able to reinvest it 
in research and development as well as other sustainable energy development 
programs.
4 Putting climate change on the developing world agenda
We believe that the EU ETS, although introduced unilaterally, has a truly global 
scope. We have seen at the way it is linked to the developing world, and thus we 
would like to tentatively suggest that part of the potential floor tax as part of the hybrid 
carbon regulation model be invested in joint renewable energy and carbon reducing 
projects in the developing world. CDM and Jl schemes under Kyoto Protocol are 
promoting conservation and carbon cut projects, yet they do not always have the 
scope of magnitude necessary for a major breakthrough. Allowing a certain percentage 
of the taxes to be used by EU industries in the developing world could set the ground 
for a more sustainable energy production in the world and work towards meeting the 
EU goal of cutting carbon emissions. This proposal requires further investigation to see 
whether it could be politically, economically and technologically viable.
In this chapter we have looked at how the EU has taken a leading role in 
carbon trading and setting the carbon price. We identified major challenges: those
162 Krugman.P., 'Building a Green Economy', (para. 51 of 81).
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coming from the developing world and from the choice of technologies. We saw/ that 
the EU has to cooperate closer with developing economies as in the contrary case EU 
carbon reduction efforts can be negligible. We also took a look at nuclear energy 
production and its disturbing consequences for livelihood, making a case for a 
rethinking o f where the EU gets its energy from. We concluded with a discussion of 
how a hybrid model with a floor tax can decrease carbon price volatility and benefit 
both investors and member state government, suggesting the use of some proportion 
of the revenues for jo int carbon reducing projects in the developing world.
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Conclusion
In this work we analyzed the EU ETS by looking at its development, 
functioning and future prospects, coming to a conclusion that the existing carbon 
regulation can be improved by introducing to the present scheme a floor tax in order to 
stabilize the prices of emission permits. We came to such a conclusions by going 
through a number of steps. First, we made an attempt to define the problem of climate 
change based on the existing scientific evidence and debate around the issue of global 
warming. Taking into consideration the major works on climate change, we assumed 
that preventive measures should be taken to avert possible risks and thus developed 
our discussion on how economics can intervene in order to create market-driven 
incentives for cutting carbon. By looking at the double dividend theory that assumes 
that regulating carbon can improve welfare, we addressed the possible regulatory 
options, namely pigovian tax and Coase's environmental endowments, that allowed us 
to arrive at a deeper understanding of the way carbon taxation and cap-and-trade 
mechanisms operate. To complete the theoretical discussion, we also reflected upon 
voluntary carbon market, coming to a conclusion that its existence is a factual proof 
that double dividend theory stands. Having reviewed the theory, we turned to the 
practical example of the EU ETS - its theoretical origins, development, functioning 
and regulatory mechanisms. We concentrated on NAP1, NAP2 and NAP3 provisions, 
and specifically on the emission distribution methods in the present and in the future. 
This set a proper framework for the investigation of the core issue of the work -  the 
emission permit volatility price and options for its stabilization. We looked at the 
possibility of an import tax, noting that WTO has suggested it is not against its free 
trade rules, and setting up of a volatility window for carbon prices. Using Ekins' 
proposal of a floor tax, we concluded that splitting the price of carbon into two 
components -  tax and the price itself, can guarantee a minimum price for a unit of 
carbon and thus contribute to its stabilization. We discussed the positive effects of 
having a floor price: providing investors with a secure minimum carbon price to 
account for in their calculations, leaving governments with stable revenues and giving 
further incentives for the use of renewable energy. These insights, however, led us to 
the consideration of negative results of increased carbon regulation, the major concern
being carbon leakage to the developing world as businesses try to keep up with their
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competitiveness. We arrived at the conclusion that shifting carbon-intensive industries 
could be a possible scenario, thus we suggested that the EU pay more attention to its 
cooperation with the developing world in order to avert any negative climate 
developments in there. We then tentatively suggested spending some part of the floor 
tax revenues on joint carbon reducing projects in the developing world, yet this idea is 
to be developed further and studied in more detail.
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